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ABSTRACT
In response to the financial credit crisis in the fall of 2008,
Congress, the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors took unprecedented action to prevent both large and
small financial institutions from insolvency. Ultimately, the
Troubled Asset Relief Program was created to inject various banks
with the cash necessary to prevent the banks' insolvency and the
threat that bank failures posed to the nation's economy.
In the midst of that crisis, Bank of America agreed to
acquire Merrill Lynch. Each institution, in their individual
capacity, received TARP funds from the Treasury several weeks
after entering into the merger agreement. But, as Merrill Lynch
suffered drastic losses in the fourth quarter of 2008, Bank of
America eventually received even more money from the Treasury
after consummating the merger in January 2009.
What subsequent SEC filings, news reports, and state and
congressional investigations reveal is that the Government
pressured Bank of America management and directors to close the
deal despite Bank of America's reluctance to do so and Bank of
America having a strong legal argument in support of its desire to
walk away from the deal. Bank of America's submission to the
Government demonstrates that corporate governance, short of best
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practices, in a time of crisis can and will significantly destroy
shareholder wealth.
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2008, Bank of America's ("BofA") Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer Ken Lewis ("Lewis") met with then
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson ("Paulson") and Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Ben Bemanke
("Bernanke"). BofA realized that its merger with Merrill Lynch &
Co. ("Merrill") had developed into a catastrophic economic loss,
and BofA sought to unwind the deal. However, Paulson and
Bernanke pressured BofA to complete the merger for the benefit of
the nation and to the detriment of BofA's shareholders. This paper
examines what the BofA Board of Directors (the "Board") did and
did not do during BofA's acquisition of Merrill and how the Board
ought to have acted differently when faced with pressure from the
Government to close the deal. While the Board's inadequate
process did not rise to the level of legal liability, the Board's
inaction constituted a failure of corporate governance and fell short
of best practices. When BofA and the Board realized that Merrill's
losses were greater than anticipated but still closed the transaction
with Merrill, the Board was acting at the behest of the Government
not BofA's shareholders.
The Board failed to consider fully the ramifications of
Merrill's losses on BofA's shareholders' wealth. BofA's share
price dropped from approximately $32 in early September 2008 to
a low of just above $3 in March 2009.' On July 20, 2009, the first
full day of trading after BofA released its second-quarter 2009
results, BofA shares closed at $12.24 per share.2 Based on the
value of outstanding BofA common stock, as of July 31, 2008
when compared to July 20, 2009, approximately $44 billion in
shareholder wealth was lost, despite over 4 billion newly issued
shares of common stock.3 One dollar invested in BofA at the close
1Yahoo! Finance, Bank of America Corporation (BAC), September 2008 to March 2009,
http://f'mance.yahoo.com/echarts?s-BAC#symbol=BAC;range=ld (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
2 Yahoo! Finance, Bank of America Corporation (BAC), supra note 1, at July 20, 2009
(last visited July 26, 2009).
3 BofA's quarterly report for the second quarter of 2008 indicated that as of July 31,
2008, 4.56 billion shares of BofA common stock were outstanding. Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly
Report (Form I0-Q), 1 (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://investor.bankofamerica.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p-irol-sec (All citations to BofA SEC filings can be found at BofA
Investor Relations web-site at the date that the Report or Statement was filed with the SEC). At the
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of the third quarter 2008 would be worth only thirty-nine cents at
the close of the second quarter of 2009, during that time, a market-
weighted index and an equal-weighted index of eleven comparable
firms receiving TARP funds would have dropped from one dollar
to only sixty-six cents and seventy five cents, respectively.4 The
Board's poor process and its submission to the Government led to
this destruction of shareholder wealth. If the Board had practiced
flawless governance, then it would have demanded that BofA not
back down to the Government and walked away from the deal.
This option, though, was not without risk, in particular lawsuits
initiated by Merrill against BofA. But, the adverse consequences of
litigation would have paled in comparison to the eventual
pummeling that BofA shareholders took after BofA acquired
Merrill. Going forward with the merger was the wrong decision
because of the toll it took on BofA shareholders' wealth - decision
that, through great governance, BofA could have avoided.
This paper progresses in Section II by presenting the
chronological facts surrounding the Government's allocation of
U.S. Treasury funds to various companies in the financial sector as
well as the facts surrounding BofA's acquisition of Merrill. Section
III presents information on the Board and the policies drafted by
BofA that guided the Board. Section IV analyzes the Board's
actions from two perspectives: (1) the legal implications of the
Board's failure to invoke the Merger Agreement's Material
Adverse Effect ("MAE") clause; and (2) best practices of corporate
governance that the Board ought to have observed. Section V
concludes by covering recent developments at BofA in the wake of
close of trading on July 31, 2008, BofA common stock traded at $32.90 per share. Yahoo! Finance,
Bank of America Corporation (BAC), supra note 1, at July 31, 2008 (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
$32.90 multiplied by 4.56 billion shares equals approximately $150 billion. As of Friday, July 17,
2009, after the issuance of shares in connection with the Merrill acquisition and other issuances,
approximately 8.65 billion shares of BofA common stock were outstanding. Bank of Am. Corp.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) July 17, 2009, 6. At the close of trading on Monday, July 20, 2009, BofA
common stock traded at $12.24 per share. Yahoo! Finance, Bank of America Corporation (BAC),
supra note 1, at July 20, 2009 (last visited July 26, 2009). $12.24 per share multiplied by 8.65 billion
equals approximately $105.876 billion. Thus, $150 billion minus $105.76 billion equals
approximately $44.124 billion.
4 See Attachment A, Value of $1 Invested in Bank of America v. Indexes of Selected
Financial Firms, ANALYSIS GROUP, INC., Aug. 12, 2009. Attachment A compares BofA with the
seven other firms (Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan
Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo) that received TARP funds on October 28, 2008; these firms
received between $2 and $25 billion from the Treasury. SunTrust, U.S. Bancorp, BB&T, and Key
Corp all received Treasury funds on November 14, 2008, ranging from $2.5 to $6.5 billion.
FinancialStability.gov, Reports and Documents, TARP Transactions Report 04/17/09, at 1, available
at http://financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/transactionreport_04-17-2009.pdf
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the annual shareholders' meeting, quarterly earnings releases,
director and officer resignations, and state and congressional
investigations. Ironically, the Government has mandated that BofA
address and improve upon its management and governance
strategies, most notably through the reconstitution of the Board.
Yet, had the Board stood up to the Government the Board would
not have faced a Government mandate. The strings that
accompanied the TARP funding to compensate BofA for absorbing
Merrill would not exist.
II. CHRONOLOGY: BOFA & THE GOVERNMENT WERE ON A
COLLISION COURSE
A. September 2008: Merger-Related Events
On September 15, 2008, BofA announced it would acquire
Merrill for approximately $50 billion.5  BofA conducted due
diligence of Merrill in forty-eight hours.6 Just over one month
earlier, in August 2008, Merrill's 10-Q for the second quarter of
2008 showed revenues of negative $4.083 billion and a net loss of
$4.634 billion.7 Merrill agreed to the merger in order to stay alive,
unlike Lehman Brothers. And, Lewis sought to satisfy his own
"personal ambitions and penchant for empire building."9 Lewis
and BofA have stood behind the decision to purchase Merrill based
on the forty-eight hours of due diligence.' 
0
5 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Sept. 15, 2008, 4. Merrill is valued at
$29.1 billion, down from $50 billion. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) Feb. 27,
2009, 17.
6 Dan Fitzpatrick et al., Thain Ousted in Clash at Bank ofAmerica, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
2009, at Al, A2.
7 Merri Lynch & Co., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q), at 4 (Aug. 5, 2008) available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/65100/000095012308008850/y64172elOvq.htm (for the
fiscal quarter ending June 27, 2008).
, See Louise Story & Julie Creswell, Love was Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at BU,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/business/08split.html?_r1t &pagewanted=2.
9 Story & Creswell, supra note 8, at BU. See generally Joe Nocera, Incompetent? No,
Just a Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at BI (noting that Lewis was "an empire builder himself,
largely continuing [former a CEO's] strategy of growing through acquisitions").
1o See Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 6, at Al, A2. BofA never asked that the investment
banking firms it hired update their due diligence after September 15, 2008. See also Heidi Moore,
Did Flowers Miss the Signs?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2009, at C3. In fact, members of the Federal
Reserve were surprised with how Lewis and BofA claimed to be caught off guard by Merrill's
December deterioration.
General consensus ... is that given market performance over past several months and
the clear signs in the date we have that the deterioration at [Merrill] has been
observably under way over the entire quarter - albeit picking up significant around
2010]
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B. September 2008: Government Funding Events
On September 19, Paulson issued a press release addressing
the financial system of the country." Despite aid directed at
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG, as well as entities hurt directly
by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, Paulson, Bemanke, and SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox took "decisive action to fundamentally
and comprehensively address the root cause of our financial
system's stresses.' 2  Citing bad mortgage assets as the cause of
the nation's credit-freeze ,13 Paulson vowed to work with Congress
to pass legislation to address the problem.14
C. October 2008: Merger-Related Events
On October 2, BofA announced that Merrill CEO John
Thain ("Thain") would become president of global banking,
securities, and wealth management at the combined BofA. 15 Both
Thain and Lewis touted the resulting corporation as the "premier
financial services company in the world.' 16  BofA announced the
prospective financial condition of the combined entity. 17  BofA
mid-November and carrying into December - Ken Lewis' claim that they were
surprised by the rapid growth of the losses seems somewhat suspect. At a minimum it
calls into question the adequacy of the due diligence process [BofA] has been doing
in preparationfor the takeover."
E-mail from Tim Clark, Senior Adviser, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, to Rita Proctor,
Federal Reserve Staff, et al., (Dec. 19, 2008, 2:29:00 EST) Bates Range BOG-BAC-ML-COGR-
00009, available at: http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090625093832.pdf
(emphasis added).
1 Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson,
Jr. on Comprehensive Approach to Market Developments (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/hpl 149.html.
12 id
131id
The federal government must implement a program to remove these illiquid assets
that are weighing down our financial institutions and threatening our economy. This
troubled asset relief program must be properly designed and sufficiently large to have
maximum impact, while including features that protect the taxpayer to the maximum
extent possible. The ultimate taxpayer protection will be the stability this troubled
asset relief program provides to our financial system, even as it will involve a
significant investment of taxpayer dollars.
Id.
14 Id. See also Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department, Statement by Secretary Henry
M. Paulson, Jr. on Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (Sept. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/ latest/hpl 162.html.
15 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Oct. 7, 2008, 4.
16 Michael de la Merced, Thain to Take a Role at Bank of America, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2008, at C8.17Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Oct. 3, 2008, 2.
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presented a backward-looking income statement assuming that the
merger closed January 1, 2007.18 The income statement showed a
$2.167 billion net loss from continuing operations.19
D. October 2008: Government Funding Events
On October 3, Congress passed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act2° ("EESA"), which gave the Government the
power to provide emergency funding to financial institutions via
several programs, including the Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP") and the Targeted Investment Program ("TIP").21 BofA
received $15 billion on October 26, 2008 through an a reement to
issue preferred stock to the U.S. Treasury ("Treasury").
E. November 2008: Merger-Related Events
On November 3, 2008, BofA filed its Proxy Statement for
the Merger Agreement (the "Merger" or the "Agreement") with the
SEC.23 The Board unanimously recommended that shareholders
approve the Merger. 24  The Proxy Statement provided BofA and
Merrill shareholders with the terms of the Merger,25 named
financial advisors, presented their fairness opinions as given to the
Board, 26 and provided valuations of each company's common
stock. 2
7
,
8 1d.
'
91d.
20 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008).
21 See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department, Paulson Statement on Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/
latest/hpl 175.html.
22 Bank. of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Oct. 30, 2008, 4 (BofA entered into a
Letter Agreement with the Treasury under which it "agreed to issue and sell (i) 600,000 shares of
[BofA's] Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock... and (ii) a warrant to . . . purchase
73,075,674 shares of [BofA's] common stock . . for an aggregate purchase price of
$15,000,000,000 in cash.").
23 Bank of Am. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM-14A) at 3 (Nov. 3,
2008).
24 Id. at 5.25 Id. at 76.
26 Id. at 63-69. Each of the two advisors delivered an oral opinion to the Board on
September 14, 2008, and each provided the Board a written report. Each opinion concluded that the
Merger was "fair, from a financial point of view, to [BofA]." Id. at 63. "In arriving at their
respective opinions, [the advisors] did not . . . make or obtain any independent valuations or
appraisals of the assets, liabilities.., or solvency of [BofA] or Merrill." Id. at 65.
27 Bank of Am. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM-14A) Nov. 3, 2008, 5.
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F. November 2008: Government Funding Events
On November 12, Paulson issued remarks that the EESA
"[had] clearly helped stabilize our financial system. ' 28  Paulson
cited the unlikely chance that a "broad systemic event" would have
negative implications on the economy and saw "signs of
improvement" in the economy. 29 BofA did not receive funds from
the Treasury in November 2008.
G. December 2008: Merger-Related Events
On December 5, at a special meeting, BofA shareholders
approved the Merger. 30  After the Merger, BofA would be "the
largest wealth management business in the world. 3 1  The
Agreement was "adopted by the requisite affirmative vote of the
holders of [BofA] Common Stock, 3 2 pursuant to the Delaware
General Corporation Law33 and the New York Stock Exchange. 34
After the vote, Lewis stated that BofA would not need any
further government assistance. 35  On December 5, BofA CFO Joe
Price ("Price") represented to Lewis that the Merrill losses were
estimated at $9 billion, and $3 billion of that figure was
"conservative[ly]" added as a cushion for unknown and
unexpected losses.36 On December 9, Price gave a presentation to
the Board about Merrill's losses.37 On December 13, Price
28 Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department, Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr.
on Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update (Nov. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/ilatest/hp1265.html.
29 Id.
30 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Dec. 5, 2008, 12.
31 Id. ("nearly 20,000 financial advisors and approximately $2.5 trillion in client assets").
32 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Nov. 3, 2008, A-40 (relying on
Section 7.1 of the Agreement).
33 Broadly, Section 141(a) of the DGCL states that "[t]he business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors." DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 141(a) (2008).
34 The authorities that require a shareholder vote are discussed in Section IV.A.
35 Deborah Solomon et al., BofA's Latest Hit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2009, at Cl ("In the
news conference announcing the deal, Mr. Lewis boasted of not needing any government
assistance.").
36 Tr. of Lewis Deposition, New York State Attorney General, In re Executive
Compensation Investigation - Bank of America - Merrill Lynch, Lewis Dep. 11:5-11, Feb. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media- center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit/2A%2Ot%24.23.09
%201etter.pdf [Hereinafter, the Lewis Dep. Tr.].
37 Dan Fitzpatrick et al., In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5,
2009, at Al, A9. See also Dan Fitzpatrick & Susanne Craig, Thain Fires Back at Bank ofAmerica,
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informed Lewis via telephone that Merrill's pre-tax losses had
grown to an estimated $12 billion.38 BofA's concern was that the
"pace of the loss increased so dramatically."
39
H. December 2008: Government Funding Events
On December 17, Lewis phoned Paulson to inform him that
BofA was "strongly considering the [MAE]" - material adverse
effect, which is a common clause in merger agreements that
enables acquiring companies to avoid closing on an accquisition
based on the economic health of the target company 4 - and
walking away from the Merrill deal.4' Paulson asked that Lewis
travel to Washington, D.C. to meet with him and Bemanke.42
Price and Brian Moynihan ("Moynihan"), then BofA General
Counsel, accompanied Lewis at this meeting; no outside counsel or
advisors accompanied the BofA officers.43  Price presented
Merrill's deteriorating financial condition to the Government.
44
The parties at that meeting discussed MAEs, and a member of
Bemanke's staff suggested to Lewis that MAEs "are tough to
qualify for.",45  Bernanke was concerned that triggering the MAlE
clause would negatively impact the entire financial system.46
BofA obliged the Government's request that BofA, for the time
being, "stand down" from using the MAE. 47
On December 19, the Government spoke with Lewis via
conference call. The Government now disagreed outright with
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at Al, AlIl (Thain contended that he accurately represented Merrill's
financial condition to BofA.). See also Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 12:16-18.
38 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 9:4-17, 10:7.
39 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 13:18-19.
40 The MAE clause is discussed at length in Section V.A.
41 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 34:3-4. See also Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at
Al, A9 ("By then, Merrill's losses had reached almost $21 billion on a pretax basis, roughly
equivalent to about $15 billion in net losses, and some of [BofA's] lawyers felt there was sufficient
grounds to invoke the legal clause to torpedo the deal.").
42 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 34:8-10.
43 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 38:3-6. See also Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at
41:19-21 ("Q. By the way, was anyone from [BofA outside counsel] Wachtell at the meeting?
[Lewis]. No.").
4Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 39:20-40:4.
45 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 41:10-13.
4 Handwritten Notes from meeting between Lewis, Price, Moynihan, Paulson, &
Bemanke (Dec. 17, 2008) Bates Range BOG-BAC-ML-COGROO0174, available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090625160518.PDF ("BB: - exposes system
to risk 2 ways - ML - BA... TARP pretty fully committed... best thing from system point of view
to go forward... then can address next year if needed b/c no $ available.").47 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 41:5.
20101
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Lewis - BofA had no legal grounds to walk away from Merrill.48
If BofA walked away from the deal, then the Government would
be less willing to provide more funding to BofA.49  The
Government threatened to oust management and directors at
BofA.5° When the Government asked Lewis what BofA would
need to close the deal, Lewis requested additional cash and
"protection against future losses on Merrill's assets., 51
On December 22, the Board held a special, telephonic
meeting where members of management also participated, but no
outside counsel or advisors participated. 52  Lewis stated that the
purpose of the meeting was "to insure that the Board is in accord
with management's recommendation to complete the acquisition of
Merrill [], as scheduled ...after ... admonitions of federal
regulators." 53  "The Board agreed it would reach a decision that it
deemed in the best interest of [BofA] and its shareholders without
48 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at Al, A9.
49 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at Al, A9.
'0 See E-mail from Jeffrey Lacker, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, to Mac
Alfriend, Sally Green, Jennifer Bums, & James McAfee, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
employees, at BOG-BAC-ML-CCOGR-00020 (Dec. 20, 2008, 11:12:00 EST), available at:
http://groc.edgeboss.net/download/groc/transfer/fed.e-mails.pdf ("Just had a long talk with Ben
[Bemanke]. Says they think the [MAE] threat is irrelevant because it's not credible. Also intends to
make it even more clear that if they play that card and then need assistance, management is
gone."(emphasis added)). See also Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America
Corporation, December 22, 2008, New York State Attorney General, In re Executive Compensation
Investigation - Bank of America - Merrill Lynch, Bates Range BAC-ML-NYAG00003873-76, at 2,
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media-center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit%20B%20to%204.23.09%20
letter.pdf (If BofA invoked the MAE, then the government "would remove the Board and
management.") [Hereinafter, Dec. 22 Board Minutes]. See also Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at
Al, A9.
51 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at Al, A9 (comparing BofA aid to that of what J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. received when it acquired Bear Steams).
52 Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra note 50, at 1.
53 Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra note 50, at 2. Lewis reported on several phone calls with
Paulson and Bernanke, the key points of which were:
(i) first and foremost, the Treasury and Fed are unified in their view that the failure of
[BofA] to complete the acquisition of Merrill [ would result in systemic risk to the
financial services system in America and would have adverse consequences for
[BofA]; (ii) second the Treasury and Fed stated that were [BofA] to invoke the
material adverse change ("MAC") clause in the merger agreement with Merrill [] and
fail to close the transaction, the Treasury and Fed would remove the Board and
management of [BofA]; (iii) third, the Treasury and Fed have confirmed they will
provide assistance to[BofA] to restore capital and protect [BofA] against the adverse
impact of certain Merrill a assets; and (iv) fourth, the Fed and Treasury stated that the
investment and asset protection promised could not be provided by the scheduled
closing date of the merger...
Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra note 50, at 2 (emphasis added).
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regard to this representation by the federal regulators." 54  The
minutes show that the Board asked that management contact
Paulson to determine how committed the Government was to
providing future funding. 55 Later on the 22nd, Lewis e-mailed the
Board to inform them that Paulson refused to reduce to writing the
terms of the Government's preliminary agreement on future
funding. 56  Paulson refused to provide a letter because doing so
would require "public disclosure which, of course, [BofA did] not
want."
57
After the December 22 meeting, management participated
in numerous telephone calls with Paulson and Bernanke. 58 On
December 30, the Board held its next telephonic special meeting;
again, members of management participated without outside
counsel or advisors. 59 Lewis informed the Board that he told the
Government BofA would have triggered the MAE "were it not for
... the status of the [U.S.] financial services system and the
adverse consequences of that situation to [BofA] .... 60 Because
the Government refused to provide written assurances to BofA,
due to the requirement of subsequent disclosure to the public,
BofA received only "detailed oral assurances." 61 Additionally, the
Government mandated that BofA lower its dividends to five cents
per share. 62 And, if BofA refused the stipulated funding from the
Government at that time, only to seek funding later, then the terms
of a future cash infusion would be "onerous" to BofA.63 Paulson
and Bernanke were in control, and Lewis and the Board knew that
the consequences of standing up to the Government would risk
their own jobs and the future of BofA if BofA needed more cash
via TARP.
54 Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra note 50, at 3.
55 Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra note 50, at 4.
56 Tom Ryan e-mail to Ken Lewis, December 22, 2008, New York State Attorney
General, In re Executive Compensation Investigation - Bank of America - Merrill Lynch, Bates
Range BC-ML-NYAG0005730, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2009/apr/
pdfs/Exhibit/ 20D%20to%204.23.09%201etter.pdf.
57 Id.
58 Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America Corporation, December
30, 2008, New York State Attorney General, In re Executive Compensation Investigation - Bank of
America - Merrill Lynch, Bates Range BAC-ML-NYAG00003877-82, available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media-center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit%/o2OC%2Oto%204.23.09%2oletter.pdf
[Hereinafter, Dec. 30 Board Minutes].
59 Dec. 30 Board Minutes, supra note 58, at 2.
60 Dec. 30 Board Minutes, supra note 58, at 2.
61 Dec. 30 Board Minutes, supra note 58, at 2-3.
62 Dec. 30 Board Minutes, supra note 58, at 4.
63 Dec. 30 Board Minutes, supra note 58, at 4.
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I. January 2009: Merger-Related Events
On January 2, 2009, BofA announced that it closed the
Merger.64 BofA cut dividends to one cent per share and announced
its first quarterly loss since 1991.65 On January 16, 2009, BofA
announced earnings for the fourth quarter of 2008; it posted a
$1.79 billion loss, excluding Merrill.66 Merrill posted a fourth
quarter net loss of nearly $15.85 billion.67  John Thain, Merrill's
CEO, resigned on January 22 amidst these losses and public debate
over the benefits and perquisites he received while at Merrill.68
J. January 2009: Government Funding Events
On January 22, BofA completed an agreement with the
Treasury where BofA issued preferred stock to the Treasury in
exchange for $20 billion.69  This agreement, to which BofA and
the Government stipulated in December, compensated BofA for
completing the Merger. 70  In total, BofA received $45 billion from
the Treasury.71
64 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Jan. 2, 2009, 4.
65 Dan Fitzpatrick & Susanne Craig, Bank of America Goes on Offense, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 17, 2009, at B3.
6Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Jan. 22, 2009, 4.
67 Fitzpatrick & Craig, supra note 65, at B3.
68 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Jan. 22, 2009, 3; See also Dan
Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 6, at Al, A2.
69 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Jan. 22, 2009, 3. In its February 2009
10-K Report for the 2008 fiscal year, BofA stated that "the U.S. [G]ovemment agreed to assist in the
Merrill [] acquisition by making a further investment in [BofA] of $20.0 billion in preferred stock."
Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) Feb. 27, 2009, 52.
70 See Deborah Solomon et at., U.S. New Plots New Phase in Banking Bailout, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 17, 2009, at Al, A2. Also, on January 9, BofA completed a transaction with the Treasury by
which it received $10 billion. This transaction was originally negotiated and achieved by Merrill in
October 2008; however, it was deferred pending completion of the Merger. Bank of Am. Corp.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) Jan. 13, 2009, 4; See also FinancialStability.gov, Reports and
Documents, TARP Transactions Report 04/17/09, at 3, 7 n.l, available at
http://financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/transaction report_04-17-2009.pdf
71 $15 billion on October 26, 2008. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. $10 billion
originally allocated to Merrill but delayed pending closing of the Merger and subsequently received
by Merrill as a BofA subsidiary on January 9. See supra note 66. $20 billion on January 22. See
supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
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K. Events Since January 2009
In early February 2009, the Board reaffirmed its suport of
Lewis, announcing it would not seek his resignation. But,
speculation of an increased Government stake in BofA hurt its
share price, 3 causing Lewis to publicly deny that BofA would
need future bailout money.74 Without a positive Government
endorsement for BofA, Lewis's tack was to contrast BofA with
Citigroup, which also received $45 billion in funds, 75 claiming that
BofA was better positioned than Citigroup for a profitable 2009.76
Lewis's public statements did little to appease angry
shareholders and institutional investors.77  Change to Win
Investment Group ("CtW"), which advises seven pension funds
that control 33 million shares of BofA demanded that the Board
ask Lewis to resign. CtW sought the resignation of the chair of
BofA's corporate governance committee, Thomas Ryan ("Ryan),
and the Lead Director, Temple Sloan, Jr. ("Sloan"), in addition to
Lewis.
78
BofA responded to the CtW campaign to remove Lewis,
Sloan, and Ryan.79  BofA defended its due diligence of Merrill
72 Dan Fitzpatrick & Susanne Craig, Lewis Seems to have BofA Board Support, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at C3.
73 Dan Fitzpatrick & Susanne Craig, BofA's Lewis Subpoenaed Over Merrill; Thain
Talks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at C1.
74 See Dan Fitzpatrick & Susanne Craig, Merrill's Losses Rise By $500 Million, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 25, 2009, at C7. See also Dan Fitzpatrick & Matthias Rieker, BofA Weighs Sale of Ex-
Merrill Unit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at C3 ("[BofA] Chairman and Chief Executive Kenneth
Lewis has said the company can ride out the financial crisis and doesn't need government aid
beyond the $45 billion it already received.").
7' Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA's Mantra: We're Not Citigroup, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2009, at
C3. See also Steven M. Davidoff, Short-Term Solutions to Long-Term Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2009, at F8 (noting that the Government can hold up to 36% of an ownership stake in Citigroup).
76 Dan Fitzpatrick, supra note 72, at C3. See also Saskia Scholtes & Greg Farrell, BofA
Chief Admits Merrill Aid 'Mistake,' FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009 available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/50000286-074f-llde-9294-000077b07658.html (BofA's request for
government funding was a '"tactical mistake' that made the bank appear as weak as Citigroup...").
But, in late March, Moody's downgraded its credit rating of BofA preferred stock to
"junk" territory due to concerns that more Government support will be needed. See Kerry Grace,
Wells, BofA Ratings Downgraded by Moody's, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at C3.
77 See Dan Fitzpatrick, Mr. Finger Pokes at BofA 's Lewis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009,
at C3. Jerry Finger sued BofA, BofA executives, and BofA directors for violation of federal
securities laws in the Southern District of New York. See also Complaint at 1, Finger Interests
Number One Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Corp. et al., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2009) (Case No. 09-CIV-00606).
Finger, who owns 1.5 million shares of BofA, sought the resignation of Lewis and two Board
members due to the losses from the Merrill acquisition.
78 Staff, Group Wants BofA CEO Out, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6,2009, at C3.79 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Apr. 14, 2009, 1.
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stating that "[a]lthough the process from agreeing on the deal to
signing the deal was compressed due to the extraordinary
conditions that existed last fall, the reality is that the [diligence]
work had been ongoing for a long time." 80  When addressing
specific questions regarding the Government's involvement in the
transaction, BofA cited ongoing litigation in New York as reason
not to respond.8' However, documents show that Bernanke and
Paulson advised Lewis not to disclose Merrill's losses to the
public.82  BofA responded that it "had no legal obligation to
disclose ongoing negotiations with the government and disclosure
of ongoing negotiations likely would have severely disrupted the
financial markets and damaged [BofA]. 83  Lewis responded to
frustrated shareholders, in early February, that "[w]e did think we
were doing the right thing for the country." 4  However, the
Board's explicit objective was not to act in the best interests of the
nation. The Board's duty was to BofA and its shareholders.
III. THE BOFA BOARD OF DIRECTORS
A. Board Mission
On December 9, 2008, BofA revised its Corporate
Governance Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), which provide:
so Id. at5.
81 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Apr. 14, 2009, 6 (Ed O'Keefe,
BofA General Counsel, responded that "as to the specifics of those conversations [with the
Government], I am not at liberty at this time to discuss them."). But see Scholtes & Farrell, supra
note 76 (BofA's request for government funding was a "'tactical mistake' that made the bank appear
as weak as Citigroup.. .").
82 See Tom Ryan e-mail to Ken Lewis, December 22, 2008, New York State Attorney
General, In re Executive Compensation Investigation - Bank of America - Merrill Lynch, Bates
Range BC-ML-NYAG0005730, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/
2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit%/*20D%2to%204.23.09%2Oletter.pdf See also Liz Rappaport, Lewis Says
US. Ordered Silence on Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2009, at AI-A2.
83 Rappaport, supra note 82, at AI-A2. In mid-December 2008, Merrill issued bonuses on
an accelerated basis and allegedly did so without fully disclosing the decision to BofA or
shareholders. The issue that triggered the investigation is whether Merrill improperly concealed
bonus payouts; in early January 2009, Cuomo subpoenaed management at BofA and Merrill,
including Lewis and Thain. See Dan Fitzpatrick & Susanne Craig, Thain 's Successor Grapples with
Dissatisfaction at BofA, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2009, at C2.
8 Dan Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at Al, A9. Lewis stated that "the [Government
was firmly of the view that terminating or delaying the closing could result in serious systemic
harm" to the nation. Dennis Berman, BofA 's Merrill Deal Exposes Myth of Transparency, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 20, 2009, at C3.
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The basic responsibility of the Board of Directors is
to oversee the Company's businesses and affairs,
exercising reasonable judgment on behalf of the
Company. In discharging that obligation, the Board
relies on the honesty, integrity, business acumen
and experience of the Company's management, as
well as its outside advisors 85 and the Company's
independent registered public accounting firm. 
8 6
Directors must attend the Annual Meeting of Stockholders, board
meetings, and committee meetings. 87  The Board must prepare
adequately for each meeting, and BofA must provide the Board
with necessary materials prior to each meeting. The Guidelines
provide for director access to management and access to outside
legal counsel and advisors at BofA's expense.
89
B. Board Organization
In addition to his CEO duties, Lewis is also Chairman of
the Board.90 The Guidelines provided for the election of a Lead
Director, who must have been independent per New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and BofA standards. 9 1  Sloan92  was
chairperson of the executive committee and had the power to call
special meetings of the independent directors at any time.93 Sloan
acted as a "liaison" between the Board and Lewis, a role which
:5 With respect to the Merrill merger and the MAE issue, the law firm of Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz acted as outside advisor to BofA. Dan Fitzpatrick et
al., supra note 37, at Al, A9.
86 Bank of America Corp., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media files/irol/71/71595/CorpGov/CorporateGovernanceGuidelinesRevised_12_9_08.pdf
[Hereinafter, BofA Corporate Governance Guidelines].
7 Bof4 Corporate Governance Guidelines, supra note 86.
8 BofA Corporate Governance Guidelines, supra note 86.
89 BofA Corporate Governance Guidelines, supra note 86. The Board is also required to
conduct an annual "self-evaluation to determine whether it and its committees are functioning
effectively. Id.
90 Bank of America Corp 2008 Annual Report at see 2; 192, available at:
http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/irol/71/71595/reports/2008_AR.pdf (stating the Lewis was
also CEO and Chairman of the Board).
91 BofA Corporate Governance Guidelines, supra note 86.
92 Bank of America Corp., 2008 Annual Report at 192, supra note 90; Bank of America
Corp., INVESTOR RELATIONS, FINANCIAL RELEASES (2006), http://investor.bankofamerica.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p-irol-newsArticle&ID=848723&highlight- (stating that Sloan is a
director and chair of the executive committee).
9' BofA Corporate Governance Guidelines, supra note 86.
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crucially includes ensuring that the Board gets key information.94S 95
Also, the Corporate Governance Committee, must "review and
report to the [B]oard on matters of corporate governance[,] defined
• .. as the relationships of the [B]oard, the stockholders, and
management in determining the . . performance of [BofA]. 96
With a foundation laid by the Board Guidelines and the Board's
organizational structure and allocation of duties to certain
members, the Board had the necessary tools and procedures in
place to respond to the crisis that the Merrill deal created.
IV. BoFA's RIGHTS UNDER THE MERGER AGREEMENT & THE
BOARD'S DUTIES
A. The BofA & Merrill Merger Agreement: Material Adverse
Effect
On September 15, 2008, BofA announced the Merger
Agreement (the "Agreement" or the "Merger") with Merrill;97 the
Merger cost BofA approximately $50 billion, through an exchange
of .8595 shares of BofA common stock for each share of Merrill
common stock. 98  Via a November 3, 2008 Proxy Statement to
shareholders, BofA solicited approval of the Merger. 99 The Board
unanimously supported the Merger and asked that shareholders
vote in its favor. 
°
Under Delaware General Corporation Law (the
"DGCL"),1°1 to increase the number of authorized shares of
common stock, a corporation must amend its certificate of
incorporation and submit the proposed amendment to its
94 BofA Corporate Governance Guidelines, supra note 86.95Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEFM-14A) Apr. 14, 2009, 7. In addition
to Ryan, the Corporate Governance Committee's other members are Gary Countryman, Patricia
Mitchell, Charles Rossotti, Temple Sloan, and Meredith Spangler. Bank of America Corp.,
COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-
govcommcomp (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
96 Bank of America Corp., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra
note 95.
97 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Sept. 15, 2008, 4.
9' Id. at 7.
99 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Nov. 3, 2008, 4.
'00 Id at 5.
101 BofA is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. See, e.g., Bank of Am.
Corp., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q) Nov. 6, 2008, 1. Therefore, Delaware law controls with respect
to the Board's fiduciary duties.
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shareholders. 10 2  BofA's November 3 Proxy Statement announced
its intention to amend its certificate of incorporation to increase its
authorized shares of common stock from 7.5 billion to 10 billion
shares in order to effect the Merger.10 3
In addition to the DGCL, the NYSE Listing Standards'
required that BofA obtain shareholder approval because the voting
power of the stock issued surpassed the threshold set by the NYSE;
the NYSE requires a shareholder vote where an issuance of stock
exceeds 20% of current, outstanding shares.' 0 5  BofA issued
approximately 1.3752 billion shares to effectuate the merger, 1°6 an
increase in common stock of approximately 27%. 107  Thus the
NYSE rules required that BofA submit the proposal to a vote.
6 8
1. Precise Language of the Merger Agreement
The crucial language of the Merger Agreement concerning
BofA's rights to back out of the Merger appeared in Section 3.8 of
Article III of the Agreement, titled "Representations and
102 DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 242(a)(5) (2008). See also DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW
242(b)(1) (2008) ("If the corporation has capital stock, its board of directors shall adopt a resolution
setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability, and ... a special meeting of the
stockholders entitled to vote in respect thereof for the consideration of such amendment . . .").
Whether the Board is legally liable for its acts or failures to act arising of out of the Merger, the
DGCL controls. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 141(a) (2008).
103 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Nov. 3, 2008, 12. BofA adhered to
the DGCL by submitting the proposed amendment for a shareholder vote.
104 BofA's securities are listed and actively traded on the NYSE. See Bank of Am. Corp.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) Feb. 27, 2009, 1-2.
"0' See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 312.03 (c) (1) (May 22, 2007).
"Shareholder approval is required prior to the issuance of common stock.., in any transaction... if
... the common stock has, or will have upon issuance, voting power equal to or in excess of 20
percent of the voting power outstanding before the issuance of such stock or of securities convertible
into or exercisable for common stock .... Id. (emphasis added).
'06 BofA exchanged 1.6 billion shares of Merrill Lynch common stock at an exchange
ratio of 0.8595; thus, .8595 of 1.6 billion represents of 1.3752 billion of newly issued BofA shares of
common stock. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) Feb. 27, 2009, 124.
107 Prior to the issuance of common stock to close the merger, at the close of the 2008
third-quarter, there were approximately 5.017 billion outstanding shares of BofA common stock.
Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) Nov. 6, 2008, 1. 1,375,200,000 divided by
5,017,579,321 equals .27407, or 27.4 %. See also Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A)
Nov. 3, 2008, 12.
108 BofA issued stock in order to effectuate a triangular merger, wherein the acquiror,
BofA, formed a wholly owned subsidiary into which Merrill would merge. BofA "propos[ed] the
merger of [Merrill] with MER Merger Corporation .... which is a newly formed wholly owned
subsidiary of [BofA]." Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Nov. 3, 2008, 5. See also
Arthur R. Pinto & Douglas M. Branson, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 135-36 (LexisNexis
2004) (describing basic framework of a triangular merger).
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Warranties of Company. ' 1°9 To best understand Section 3.8, it
must be read in the context of other provisions that defined key
terms and obligations. Section 3.8, titled "Absence of Certain
Changes or Events," stated:
(a) Since June 27, 2008, no event or events have
occurred that have had or would reasonably be
expected to have, either individually or in the
aggregate, a Material Adverse Effect on Company.
As used in this Agreement, the term "Material
Adverse Effect" means, with respect to [BofA] or
[Merrill], as the case may be, a material adverse
effect on (i) the financial condition, results of
operations or business of such party and its
Subsidiaries taken as a whole (provided, however,
that, with respect to clause (i), a "Material Adverse
Effect" shall not be deemed to include effects to the
extent resulting from (A) changes, after the date
hereof, in GAAP or regulatory accounting
requirements . . . , (B) changes, after the date
hereof, in laws, rules, regulations or the
interpretation of laws, rules or regulations by
Governmental Authorities . . . , (C) actions or
omissions taken with the prior written consent of
the other party or expressly required by this
Agreement, (D) changes in global, national or
regional political conditions (including acts of
terrorism or war) or general business, economic or
market conditions, including changes generally
in... credit markets and price levels or trading
volumes in the United States or foreign securities
markets, in each case generally affecting the
industries in which such party or its Subsidiaries
operate... 11
109 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Nov. 3, 2008, A-13.
"0 Id. (emphasis added). This last carve out, (D), is notable because it precludes either
party from asserting cause for invoking the MAE due to industry-wide and economy-wide
downturns. If BofA were solely to rely on the fact that the recession of late 2008 and 2009 were
cause for invoking the MAE, BofA's argument would fail because such a downturn would be a
"change[] in ... general business, economic or market conditions .... " Id
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In Section 7.2(a), Merrill agreed that the "Representations
and Warranties" would be true not only on the date of the
Agreement - September 15 - but on the date that the Merger
closed:
Subject to the standard set forth in Section 9.2,[ll3
the representations and warranties of [Merrill] set
forth in this Agreement shall be true and correct as
of the date of this Agreement and as of the Effective
Time as though made on and as of the Effective
Time (except that representations and warranties
that by their terms speak specifically as of the date
of this Agreement or another date shall be true and
correct as of such date); and [BofA] shall have
received a certificate signed on behalf of [Merrill]
by the Chief Executive Officer or the Chief
Financial Officer of [Merrill] to the foregoing
effect. 12
Section 7.2(b), "Performance of Obligations of [Merrill],"
mandated that Merrill's CEO or CFO certify the warranty that
Merrill met its duties under the Agreement "at or prior to the
Effective Time."" 3 Section 1.2, "Effective Time," stated:
The Merger shall become effective as set forth in
the certificate of merger (the "Certificate of
Merger") that shall be filed with the Secretary of
State of the State of Delaware on the Closing Date.
I11 Section 9.2 of the Agreement stated the applicable standard by which to evaluate
Section 7.2(a):
No representation or warranty of [Merrill] contained in Article III... shall be
deemed untrue, inaccurate or incorrect for any purpose under this Agreement, and no
party hereto shall be deemed to have breached a representation or warranty for any
purpose under this Agreement, in any case as a consequence of the existence or
absence of any fact, circumstance or event unless such fact, circumstance or event,
individually or when taken together with all other facts, circumstances or events
inconsistent with any representations or warranties contained in Article III, in the
case of [Merrill] ... has had or would reasonably be expected to have a Material
Adverse Effect with respect to [Merrill] ....
Id. at A-43 (emphasis added).
112 Id. at A-40 (emphasis added). Section 7.2(b), "Performance of Obligations of
[Merrill]," mandated that Merrill's CEO or CFO certify the warranty that Merrill met its duties under
the Agreement. See Id. at A-40.
" Id. at A-40 ("[BofA] shall have received a certificate signed on behalf of [Merrill] by
the Chief Executive Officer or the Chief Financial Officer of [Merrill] to such effect.").
2010]
FSUBUSINESS REVIEW
The term "Effective Time" shall be the date and
time when the Merger becomes effective as set forth
in the Certificate of Merger."
14
BofA announced the Merger's completion as December 31, 2008;
hence, that date is the "Effective Time" pursuant to Section 1.2.11
Section 8.1 discussed "Termination" of the Agreement; it stated:
This Agreement may be terminated at any time
prior to the Effective Time, . . . (d) by either
[Merrill] or [BofA] (provided that the terminating
party is not then in material breach of any
representation, warranty, covenant or other
agreement contained herein), if there shall have
been a breach of any of the covenants or agreements
or any of the representations or warranties set forth
in this Agreement on the part of [Merrill], in the
case of a termination by [BofA] . . . which
breach.., would result in, if occurring or
continuing on the Closing Date, the failure of the
conditions set forth in Section 7.2 or 7.3, as the case
may be, and which is not cured within 30 days
following written notice to the party committing
such breach or by its nature or timing cannot be
cured within such time period .... 116
Together, these provisions meant that because Merrill represented
that it had not experienced a MAE after June 27, 2008, BofA could
have terminated the Agreement prior to December 31, 2008, the
"Effective Time", if Merrill did experience a MAE. Section 3.8 set
out the basic warranty that no MAE had occurred since June 27,
2008. Sub-sections 7.2(a) and (b) bolstered Section 3.8 because
Merrill management certified that no MAE would occur through
the effective time of the Merger. And, Section 1.2 described the
effective time as the closing date of December 31, 2008, which
was confirmed via a BofA 8-K filing. Finally, Section 8.1 held that
"4 Id. A-I. The Certificate of Merger, under DGCL Section 252(c), which references
Section 251, is to be filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware on the date the merger
is effective. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 251, 252(c) (2008).
"' Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Jan. 2, 2009.
116 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Nov. 3, 2008, A40-41 (emphasis
added).
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a breach of any warranty by Merrill, including the MAE clause,
would allow for BofA to terminate the Merger Agreement.
2. Tyson v. I13P: Delaware Case Law on MAEs Requires
Prolonged Losses Where the Acquiring Company is a
Strategic Buyer
Any legal argument that BofA would have made in support
of backing out of the Merger would have not only relied on the
language of the Agreement but would have also relied the legal
precedent set by In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation (the
"Tyson" case).'1 7 In Tyson, the Delaware Court of Chancery
addressed whether a strategic acquiror may terminate a merger
agreement if the target company's financial results breached a
MAE."18 Tyson Foods ("Tyson") placed the winning bid to
acquire IBP, Inc. ("IBP") in a heated auction. During the bidding
process, Tyson ignored information that foreshadowed significant
financial problems with an IBP subsidiary. 119 And, industry-wide
forecasts suggested that all firms in Tyson's and IBP's sector -
producers of beef, poultry and pork - would experience losses due
to severe winter weather. 120
After the contentious auction process in fall 2000, Tyson
and IBP signed the merger agreement in early January 2001. Two
weeks later, Tyson shareholders ratified the acquisition.' 2 1 On
March 29, 2001, Tyson announced it was terminating its
agreement to acquire IBP citing, among other reasons, financial
restatements at both IBP and an IBP subsidiary as cause to invoke
the MAE clause in the merger agreement.'12  JBP sued Tyson
seeking specific performance of the merger agreement one day
after Tyson's March 29th announcement. 2ag
The Tyson-IBP agreement defined a MAE as "any event,
occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts
which has had or reasonably could be expected to have a Material
1 In re IBP S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001). This 2001 decision is the
"seminal" authority with respect to analysis of MAEs. See Jonathan M. Grech, "Opting Out"
Defining Material Adverse Change Clause in a Volatile Economy, " 52 EMORY L.J. 1483, 1506-07
(2003).
IRS Grech, supra, note 117.
19 In re IBP S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 22 (Del. Ch. 2001).
120 id.
121 Id. at 44.
122 Id. at 50-51. See also id. at 65 ("Tyson claims that it is virtually indisputable that the
combination of these factors amounts to a [MAE].").
12' Id. at 51.
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Adverse Effect . . . on the condition (financial or otherwise),
business, assets, liabilities or results of operations of [IBP] and [its]
Subsidiaries taken as whole."'124 There were no express exclusions
from this broad language in the agreement. 25 IBP represented that
its liabilities and financial risks were fully disclosed in pertinent
SEC filings. 126
Tyson argued that it ought to be permitted to terminate the
merger with IBP "because IBP had breached ... the [a]greement,
which is a representation and warranty that IBP had not suffered a
[MAE] since the 'Balance Sheet Date' of December 25, 1999. ',]27
The text of the merger agreement dictated that the court consider
whether a MAE had occurred since, and in comparison to, the
December 25, 1999 condition of IBP as IBP had warranted its
financial condition to be on that date.128 The court stated that this
approach - comparing IBP's representations in the agreement with
its actual financial condition as of December 25, 1999 - made
"commercial sense because it establishe[d] a baseline that roughly
reflect[ed] the status of IBP as Tyson indisputably knew [IBP] at
the time of signing the [m]erger [a]greement."12 9
The court settled on a standard of evaluation that examined
the target's projected performance over a period of years, not
months. 3 ° The court placed the burden on the acquiror that
invoked the MAE seeking to unwind the merger agreement.' 3 1
124 Id. at 65.
125 Id. at 66. This lack of exclusions is in contrast to the four types of exclusions in the
BofA-Merrill Agreement.
16 Id. at 40.
117 Id. at 65.
128 Id. at 66 (The merger agreement "require[d] the court to examine whether a MAE
ha[d] occurred against the December 25, 1999 condition of IBP as adjusted by the specific by the
specific disclosures of the Warranted Financials and the [a]greement itself.").29 id.
"0 Id. at 67.
To a short-term speculator, the failure of a company to meet analysts' projected
earnings for a quarter could be highly material. Such a failure is less important to an
acquiror who seeks to purchase the company as part of a long term strategy. To such
an acquiror, the important thing is whether the company has suffered a [MAE] in its
business or results of operations that is consequential to the company's earnings
power over a commercially reasonable period, which one would think would be
measured in years rather than months. It is odd to think that a strategic buyer would
view a short-term blip in earnings as material, so long as the target's earnings-
generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or the blip's cause.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
131 Id. at 67-68. That Tyson was a strategic buyer is significant because, as an acquiror,
Tyson's focus ought to have been on long profits derived from IBP after the acquisition. Id.
Delaware courts use "standard of the 'reasonable buyer' in the acquirer's actual shoes, in pursuit of
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The court held that the acquiror must make a "strong showing" that
the target company experienced events which rise to the level of a
material adverse impact on the target's revenues for years, not
months.1
32
Tyson failed to carry its burden to show that from the
"perspective of a reasonable acquiror' ' 133 IBP suffered such a
MAE. 134 Citing Tyson's own reliance on analyst projections for
IBP - projections that eventually saw long term profits for IBP -
the court rejected Tyson's claims.' 35 Further, the court relied on
IBP's historical financial figures. These figures represented "a
company that is consistently profitable, but subject to strong
swings in annual . . . net earnings."' 36  These facts led to the
court's conclusion that IBP, while damaged by short-term losses,
had a positive long term financial prognosis.'3 7  After Tyson,
Delaware courts consider the prolonged impact of the claimed
MAE on the target company's revenues to determine whether a
target company sustained a MAE.' 38
3. Tyson Applied: BofA Should Have Walked Away
In December 2008, BofA believed that Merrill's losses
were severe and would extend indefinitely into the future, enough
that BofA felt it could invoke the MAE clause of the Agreement.
Lewis suggested to Bernanke and Paulson on December 17 that
BofA might terminate the Agreement, but two days later, Bernanke
and Paulson rebuffed this move and insisted that BofA
consummate the Merger. 139 The Agreement defined MAE as "a
material adverse effect on (i) the financial condition, results of
operations or business of such party and its Subsidiaries taken as a
the acquirer's actual goals as the court sees them .... Tyson . . . [was] pursuing a strategic move
rather than a short-term opportunity. This informed the court's analysis of whether a sharp decline in
IBP's earnings was material..." Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed
Economy, 2002 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 846, 853 (2002) (citing In re IBP S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d
at 68).
137 In re IBP S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d at 68 (Del. Ch. 2001).
1
33 id.
34 Id. at 71.
135 id.
136 Id. at 67.
137 id.
138 Other courts and decisions have applied the legal framework and analysis from Tyson.
See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1025 (D. S.D.
2003); Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008).
139 Dan Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at Al, A9.
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whole."'140 This language was similar to the Tyson MAE.141 In
order for Merrill to have sustained a MAE, material and adverse
impacts on its financial condition must have occurred since June
27, 2008, the baseline date established in Section 3.8(a) of the
Agreement. Tyson also established a baseline date from which to
begin analysis of the target's financial condition. 142  However,
unlike Tyson, if Merrill's MAE resulted from four categorical
exclusions, BofA was precluded from invoking the MAE. These
exclusions barred BofA's reliance on certain circumstances as
cause to invoke the MAE. 1
43
Finally, the material and adverse effects on Merrill's
financial results could not constitute a MAE if they amounted only
to short-term "blip; ' 44 instead, Merrill must have been expected to
accrue severe losses years into the future. 14 5 In Tyson, the court's
ruling ultimately rested on the fact that IBP would eventually
return to profit, and thus Tyson could not rely on the MAE as a
way out of the merger. 146  Only if BofA proved that Merrill's
losses would rise over years would BofA have successfully relied
on the MAE. Applying Tyson to BofA's predicament, a court
might have found that BofA was justified to walk away; on the
other hand, court might not have done so if the matter had ever
gone to judgment. 147  Still, BofA might have settled Merrill
lawsuits after BofA invoked the MAE; r48 any settlement would
likely have been considered a victory for BofA and its
shareholders.
140 Bank of Am. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14-A), at A-13 (Nov. 3,
2008) (emphasis added). Notably, the IBP-Tyson agreement did not include categorical events, such
as the global political climate or market conditions, as being expressly excluded as cause for
termination. See In re IBP, Inc.S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d at 65-66 ("Although many merger
contracts contain specific exclusion from MAE clauses that cover declines in the overall economy or
the relevant industry sector, or adverse weather or market conditions, § 5.10 [of the IBP-Tyson
agreement] is unqualified by such express exclusions.") (footnote omitted).
141 See In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d at 44, 65.
142 See id. and supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
143 See supra text accompanying note 107.
14 In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d at 67.145 Cf id.
146 id.
147 See Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch.
2008) ("Many commentators have noted that Delaware courts have never found a material adverse
effect to have occurred in the context of a merger agreement.").
'48 BofA and its outside counsel expected Merrill to sue BofA should BofA back out of
the deal. E-mail from Eric Roth, Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Brian Moynihan,
General Counsel at Bank of America, Bates Range BAC-ML-HOGR-00000917-921 (Dec. 19, 2008
1:48 AM GMT) (on file with author) ("But if we do terminate the Merger Agreement, we can expect
[Merrill] to initiate litigation.").
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a. Like Tyson, BofA Was a Strategic Buyer
Tyson was a "strategic buyer"' 49 that sought to acquire IBP
in hopes to "create the world's preeminent meat products
company-a company that would dominate meat cases of
supermarkets in the United States and eventually throughout the
globe."' 50 The threshold question in comparing Tyson with BofA
is whether BofA was indeed the "strategic buyer."' 151 That
undoubtedly is the case with BofA. In September 2008, in its 8-K
that announced the Merger, BofA led with the headline "Bank of
America Buys Merrill Lynch Creating Unique Financial Services
Firm."'152 Lewis remarked that "[a]cquiring one of the premier
wealth management, capital markets, and advisory companies is a
great opportunity for our shareholders . . . . Together, our
companies are more valuable because of the synergies in our
business.,"1
53
Tyson and IBP planned to achieve synergies by way of
Tyson's dominance in the poultry business and IBP's dominance
in the pork and beef businesses. Similarly, BofA and Merrill
planned to achieve synergies because BofA specialized in retail
and commercial banking services,1 55 while Merrill specialized in
offering investment banking services and wealth management
services.156 These two financial institutions, combined under the
BofA name, formed "the number one underwriter of global high
yield debt, the third largest underwriter of global equity and the
ninth largest adviser on global mergers and acquisitions based on
first half of 2008 results.' 57  BofA was to be a financial
powerhouse after its acquisition of Merrill.
149 In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d at 67.
'
5
o Id.
"' Id
152 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) at 7 (Sept. 15, 2008).
1
53 Id. (emphasis added).
154 789 A.2d at 22.
155 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) at 7 (Sept. 15, 2008).
156 Id. (By adding Merrill Lynch's more than 16,000 financial advisers, [BofA] would
have the largest brokerage in the world with more than 20,000 advisers and $2.5 trillion in client
assets.").
157 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) at 8 (Sept. 15, 2008) (based on pro
forma results).
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b. Losses Were Long-Term: Merrill Would Fold
Without BofA
In contrast to IBP, Merrill's catastrophic losses in late 2008
were long-term and not likely to rebound at any point after the
fourth quarter of 2008. As of mid-December, BofA was aware that
Merrill sustained approximately $12 to $13 billion in pre-tax losses
in the fourth quarter of 2008.158 That figure grew to $15.85
billion. 159 The Tyson requirement that the target firm's losses be of
a prolonged duration would have been met - Merrill would have
been forced to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection had BofA
not stepped in.
160
In contrast, the Tyson court's conclusion that Tyson could
not rely on the MAE clause to terminate the IBP merger rested on
the fact that IIBP's financial condition would soon improve. A
more apt comparison to the BofA-Merrill situation is the Enron-
Dynegy case. In November 2001, Dynegy Inc. agreed to purchase
the Enron Corporation. 16 1  Dynegy walked away from the deal
claiming that Enron misrepresented its financial condition.161
Enron alleged that, by walking away, Dynegy caused it to file for
bankruptcy and sought $10 billion in damages in an adversary
complaint filed concurrently with its Chapter 11 Petition. 163  In
defense, Dynegy relied on "the material adverse change (MAC)
provision of the agreement."'164 Dynegy cited an Enron debt
obligation for approximatey $690 million as the impetus to walk
away from the acquisition.1 5 Dynegy settled the adversary dispute
with Enron for $88 million. 166
15s Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at Al, A9.
159 Fitzpatrick & Craig, supra note 74, at C7.
"o See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Louise Story, A Sudden End to Merrill Lynch Chiefs
Charmed Rise, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (New York), Jan. 24, 2009, at 13 (Merrill's
former CEO, Thain, kept "'Mother Merrill' from following Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy."). See
also Rich Schapiro, Street Fears Lehman Tsunami, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2008, at 5 (noting
that "Lehman Brothers' apparent bankruptcy made Merrill... especially vulnerable").
161 Martin Sikora, Dynegy / Enron Suit Hinges on MAC Clause, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS JOURNAL, Mar. 1, 2002.1621id.
163 Id. See also In re Enron Corp., 292 B.R. 507, 509-10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
16 Sikora, supra note 161. MACs and MAEs are intuitively similar provisions and
protect companies in a similar fashion. See, e.g., Alana Zerbe, The Material Adverse Effect
Provision: Multiple Interpretations & Surprising Remedies, 22 J.L. & COM. 17, 19 (2002).
165 Sikora, supra note 161.
'6 In re Enron Corp., Case No. 02-CIV-8489 (AKH), 2003 WL 230838, at *]-*3,
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2003) ("Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Dynegy was to pay Enron $88
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Enron and Merrill were distressed target corporations when
they reached agreements to be acquired by stable corporations.
When Dynegy announced that it would terminate the merger with
Enron on November 28, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11
protection, on December 2.167 In the interim period of four days,
credit ratings agencies downgraded Enron to "'junk' status.
'1 6 8
Implicit in the Government's compulsion of BofA to close the deal
was the fact that Merrill's losses were so severe that had it not
been acquired by BofA it would collapse. Bernanke and Paulson
warned BofA "that abandoning the deal would be a death sentence
for Merrill.
16 9
Like Dynegy and Enron, had BofA walked away from
Merrill, Merrill's collapse and bankruptcy would have quickly
materialized - much like Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
i%
A target corporation, like Merrill, meets the Tyson requirement of
an extended duration of a negative financial condition. Merrill
teetered on the edge of failure due to its severe losses. Merrill
would have been forced to file for Chapter 11 protection absent the
Government's insistence that BofA acquire Merrill.'71 Merrill's
million in settlement, and Dynegy and Enron released and discharged their respective claims against
each other.").
167 In re Enron Corp., 292 B.R. at 507.
16 8 id.
169 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at Al, A9.
170 Louise Story & Ben White, The Road to Lehman 's Failure was Littered with Lost
Chances, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at BI. See also Louise Story, Merrill Reports Its Fifth
Quarterly Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at Al ("It was widely expected that Merrill would be
the next investment bank to collapse after Lehman, and Merrill's stock and credit were under attack
in the markets."). BofA was even contemplating acquiring Lehman, but when BofA shifted its focus
to Merrill, Lewhman was left without a suitor. Story & White, supra, at BI ("By the weekend of
Sept. 14-15, most Lehman workers knew the firm's days as an independent bank were over. [The
Lehman CEO] continued fevered deal talks with [BofA] and Barclays, but both banks dropped out
by the end of the weekend. Meanwhile, Wall Street executives at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York quickly shifted conversations from preventing a bankruptcy of Lehman to dealing with its
consequences."). And, like Enron, Lehman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection almost
immediately after its potential acquirer walked. Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files
Biggest Bankruptcy Case as Suitors Balk, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=awh5hRyXkvs4&pid=20601087. See also In re Lehman
Bros. Holdings Inc., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), 2008 WL 4902179, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
2008) (order regarding workers compensation benefits).
171 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 37, at Al, A9. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors
even compared Merrill to Lehman in December 2008. See Talking points for BankAmerica
Discussion (Dec. 21, 2008), Bates Range BOG-BAC-ML-COGR-00027-00029, at 1, available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090625093832.pdf ("The public assertion of
the [MAE], however, would likely cause the demise of [Merrill] in much the same fashion as the
collapse of Lehman.").
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problems were not a short-term "blip," 72 rather, the grim reaper of
banking had knocked on its door.
Given the significant and deteriorating condition of Merrill,
had Lewis or the Board opposed the Government and moved
forward with terminating the Merger, then Tyson would have
supported BofA. Undoubtedly, Merrill would have sued BofA for
damages, as Enron sued Dynegy. Yet, Enron and Dynegy settled
for $88 million, only 8.8% the amount of damages that Enron
claimed. 173  While a suit from Merrill was definite, given the
relative success of Dynegy, BofA and the Board could have
expected a better result for its share price and its shareholders had
it walked away and ultimately settled a Merrill lawsuit rather than
closing the merger.
c. Wrapping Up the Tyson Comparison: MAE Carve-
Outs
While the carve-outs in the BofA-Merrill MAE counter an
argument in support of the MAE, those exceptions ultimately
would not defeat the MAE. Section 3.8(a) of the Agreement
prevented BofA from relying on the MAE if such reliance was
based on one of four excluded circumstances.' 74 One of the four
exclusions was "changes in ... economic or market conditions,
including changes generally in. . . credit markets and price levels
or trading volumes in the United States."' 75  For BofA and its
Board to have succeeded with the MAE, they must have been able
to demonstrate that Merrill's losses were not caused by systemic
problems in the credit markets. Instead, Merrill's problems must
have been unique to its business and portfolio of assets. If not, then
BofA's reliance on the MAE would have failed in court.
In January 2009, BofA attributed the Merrill losses to
"severe capital markets dislocations," potentially negating
conjecture that BofA would have prevailed when relying on the
172 In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d at 67.
173 The losses that spurred Dynegy to walk away from Enron were only $690 million
compared to the $15.85 billion dollar loss with which Merrill was saddled. That the magnitude of the
Enron-Dynegy figures were considerably smaller than those at issue in BofA-Merrill supports the
chances that BofA could have achieved a modest settlement mitigating its ultimate losses. However,
this comparison is made with no weight or percentages available to determine the relative impact of
each respective target company's losses.
174 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A) Nov. 3, 2008, at A-13.
1
7 5 id.
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MAE. 17 6 This language mirrored one of the exclusions Section
3.8(a) set forth. 17 7  Yet, this provision of the Agreement was an
exclusion. Affording too much strength to the change-in-credit-
markets exclusion would nullify the MAE because credit markets
were already tumultuous when BofA and Merrill entered into the
Agreement.17  The sophisticated parties that drafted the
Agreement would not have allowed for an exclusion to negate the
entire MAE.
BofA specifically attributed portions of the Merrill losses to
"credit valuation adjustments . . . goodwill impairments . . .
leveraged loan writedowns . . . [and] commercial real estate
writedowns."'179 While some of these factors dealt with changes in
the credit markets, not all did. The negative impact from goodwill
impairments, leveraged loan writedowns, and commercial real
estate writedowns added up to $5.84 billion.18° Reports also
suggest that the credit markets during December were relatively
"calmer than they were in October and November."'' That
considerable losses were not caused by changes in the credit
markets bolsters the conclusion that, had BofA relied on the MAE,
it would not have been precluded by that exclusion. While the
change-in-credit-markets exclusion gives pause when considering
how successful BofA's use of the MAE would have been, that
exclusion alone would not have defeated BofA in court. Still, while
BofA had considerable support from Tyson and the facts of
Merrill's losses, a court would not have granted a request by BofA
that, based on Tyson and the MAE, it be granted a declaratory
176 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Jan. 16, 2009, Ex. 99.1. Further, that
the merger already closed and the effective date had passed makes invocation of the MAE clause
impossible.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
178 See Paul Krugman, Crisis Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at AI9 (noting that
the "real shock after the feds failed to bailout Lehman Brothers wasn't the plunge in the Dow, it was
the reaction in the credit markets" ). See generally, David Leonhart, Top Priority is Stabilizing the
Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at B1. See also Keith Bradsher & Carter Dougherty, Economic
Uncertainty Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at B 1.
179 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Jan. 16, 2009, at 13. BofA described
these and one other factor, writedowns in the U.S. Bank Investment Securities Portfolio, as "negative
fourth-quarter items for Merrill []." Id. In total, the sum of losses associated with these factors
totaled $9.74 billion. Id.
180 Id.
181 Shawn Tully, Divorce Bank of America Style, FORTUNE, Feb. 16, 2009, at 70 (noting
that $3.2 billion in Merrill losses were derived from "correlation trades" where bond prices fell
greater than the credit default swaps insuring those bonds increased, causing investors to dump their
swap investments rapidly). "[M]ystery still shrouds the epic write-downs..." Id.
2010]
,) FSUBUSINESS REVIEW [Vol. 9
judgment permitting it to back out of the Merger. 182  Like Enron
and Dynegy, BofA and Merrill would have likely reached a
settlement - the MAE, its provisions, and its exclusions would
have influenced the terms of that settlement. 183
4. The Board Did Not Breach Its Duty of Care
A publicly-traded corporation's directors, like BofA, owe
distinct fiduciary duties to shareholders, 184  including care and
loyalty, which implicate a corollary duty of good faith. 5 But, the
business judgment rule ("BJR") protects directors with a
presumption that "limits courts in questioning business decisions.
The focus of any judicial inquiry will usually be on the decision
making process not the decision, ' 186  decisions including whether
182 See Hexion, 965 A.2d at 762-63 (denying strategic buyer's request that MAE prevent
merger even where buyer's expert witnesses testified that the combined entity would be insolvent).
BofA's own lawyers were well aware that "no Delaware court has ever found that a MAC occurred
permitting an acquiror to terminate a merger agreement." E-mail from Eric Roth, Partner at
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Brian Moynihan, General Counsel at Bank of America, Bates
Range BAC-ML-HOGR-00000917-921 (Dec. 19, 2008 1:48 AM GMT) (on file with author).
183 Documents released detail the discussions between Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
and BofA addressing the strength of BofA's MAE argument. SeeE-mail from Eric Roth, Partner at
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Brian Moynihan, General Counsel at Bank of America, Bates
Range BAC-ML-HOGR-00000917-921 (Dec. 19, 2008 1:48 AM GMT) (on file with author).
Despite admitted flaws in the argument to back out, on December 21, when Lewis spoke to Paulson,
Lewis still held "the view that there has been a MAC at Merrill - and every day their numbers get
worse." E-mail from Nicholas Demmo, Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Price and
Brian Moynihan, BofA General Counsel, Bates Range BAC-ML-HOGR-00000940-942 (Dec. 21,
2008 12:06 AM GMT) (on file with author).
184 See, e.g., In re Citigroup S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114-16, n.6 (Del.
Ch. 2009); In re Transkaryotic Therapies Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 357 n.20 (Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting
Malpiede v. Towson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001)). See also Pinto & Branson, supra note 108,
at 199 ("In the corporate context, directors and officers are in a fiduciary relationship to their
corporation and to the shareholders.").
185 Pinto & Branson, supra note 108, at 200. Delaware courts have held that "the
obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the
same footing as the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, may
directly result in liability .. " Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
1S6 Pinto & Branson, supra note 108, at 200. See also D. Gordon Smith & Cynthia A.
Williams, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASE, PROBLEMS, & CASE STUDIES 502 (Aspen
Publishers 2008) ("The fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers
simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions
has been doctrinally labeled the business judgment rule.") (quoting Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885
(2d Cir. 1982)).
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to acquire another corporation 187 and whether to approve an
executive's compensation.
188
a. The Presumption of the Business Judgment Rule
Protects the Board
The BJR presumes that directors acted on informed basis,
in good faith, and with the honest belief that their actions were in
the best interest of the corporation. 189  If shareholder plaintiffs
allege that a board violated the duty of care, plaintiffs must rebut
the presumptions of the BJR.190 Rarely do plaintiffs prevail with
allegations that a board violated its duty of care. 
191
Delaware case law applying the BJR extensively protects
the decisions of boards of directors faced with claims that they
violated their fiduciary duty of care. 192  "In the absence of facts
showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate officer or
director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that
may be suffered as a result of a decision that an officer made or
that directors authorized in good faith."'1 93 In the rare instance that
a Delaware court found a board liable, that board acted in a grossly
negligent manner. 194  The BofA Board did not act grossly
negligent regarding the Merger.
387 See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator Techs. Inc. S'holders Litig., Case No. 11495, 1992 WL
212595, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 1, 1992) (adjudicating shareholder complaint challenging proposed
merger filed against board of directors).
188 See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(adjudicating shareholder derivative complaint against director defendants arising out of hiring and
firing of president of company).
189 See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1992). See also Van Gorkum at 858
(Del. 1985) (en banc) (with respect to issue of "on an informed basis" a gross negligence standard
applies to actions of board).
190 See generally Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858.
'9' See Smith & Williams, supra note 186, at 502 ("The potential liability risk from a
breach of this duty is near zero in the corporate context, however, because of a powerful effect of the
'business judgment rule."').
192 See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Tri-Foods International Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch.
1996).
113 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1051.
'94 See Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 868-69 (finding gross negligence where directors: (i)
were uninformed as to role of owner of acquirer's holding company in sale of company, (ii) were
uninformed as to proper intrinsic value of company, and (iii) were grossly negligent in approving
sale of company after only two hours of deliberations).
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b. The DGCL Further Protects the Board
In addition to the BJR, Section 141(e) of the DGCL
protects board members from liability in a duty of care case when
the board relies on officers or experts. 195
A member of the board of directors ... shall ... befully protected in relying in good faith upon the
records of the corporation and upon ... opinions,
reports or statements presented to the corporation
by any.., officers or employees.., or by any other
person as to matters the member reasonably
believes are within such other person's professional
or expert competence and who has been selected
with reasonable care by or on behalf of the
corporation. 196
So long as the Board, in good faith, relied on the diligence of
outside investment bankers and the internal presentations by BofA
management, the Board was shielded from liability. Assuming that
BofA chose its investment bankers with reasonable care, reliance
on those experts' presentations and the experts' conclusion that the
merger was financially fair to BofA's shareholders protected the
Board from liability for making a bad decision that turned out to
harm shareholders. Reliance on the advice of Price and Lewis, as
well as the fairness opinions resulting from hastily compiled due
diligence in September, protected the Board from liability. 197
195 Cf Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 936-37 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that DGCL
§§ 102(b)(7) and 141(e) protect and insulate a board's "reliance on experts").
196 DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 141(e) (2008) (emphasis added).
197 But, the DGCL does not protect a board if and when it acts in a way that would place
its responsibilities on the shoulders of the shareholders. Section 251 (b) holds that directors must act
in a deliberate manner and may not abdicate their decision-making power to shareholders in the
merger context. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 251(b) (2008) ("The board of directors of each
corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement
of merger or consolidation and declaring its advisability."). While a shareholder vote was required
by the NYSE and the DGCL, the vote is not a mechanism for the Board to transfer responsibility to
shareholders. Delaware case law holds that directors may be held liable for violations of the duty of
care in the merger context but that the directors must have acted grossly negligent when acting
uninformed and approving a merger that damages the interests of shareholders. Van Gorkum, 488
A.2d at 858.
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B. Best Practices: The Board Should Have Held Itself to a
Standard Above the Minimum Care That Would Avoid Liability
While the Board is not liable for a breach of the duty of
care for proceeding with the deal, the standard of care required to
escape civil liability under Delaware law is the minimum standard
for board conduct - Delaware courts have stated that directors
should aim higher. 198 A board's inherent and explicit duty to put
the wealth shareholders ahead of any other obligation trumps any
court order that set out a minimum standard of care for boards of
directors. 199 To adhere to best practices of corporate governance a
board must place all obligations other than shareholder wealth
subordinate to its primary goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.
The BofA Board of Directors failed in this regard.
1. Disney Provides Best Practices Discussion
With In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. ,200 (the
"Disney case") the Delaware Court of Chancery discussed the
difference between bare compliance with statutory and case law
and "[a]spirational ideals of good corporate governance
practices. ' zol After Walt Disney Co. hired and later fired President
Michael Ovitz, it was required to pay Ovitz a large severance
package.202  Shareholders sued derivatively the compensation
committee of the board for allegedly breaching its fiduciary duties
when it approved Ovitz's severance package.2 0 3  After trial, the
court found in favor of the director defendants on all claims.
20
19' In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.399 (Del. Ch. 2005)
("This Court strongly encourages directors and officers to employ best practices, as those practices
are understood at the time a corporate decision is taken.").
'99 This is the shareholder primacy norm, which holds that a corporation is created and
governed by the board for the benefit of the shareholders. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad & Not-So-
Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (2002) (discussing
commentators' beliefs that the corporation exists to maximize profits) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36-39 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1991)). See also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681-82 (Mich. 1919) (finding that
board of Ford Motor Co.'s decision - motivated by Henry Ford's ambition to spread the "benefits of
th[e] industrial system" - to halt distribution of special dividends to shareholders despite increased
profits violated the law).
200 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
20! Id at 745 n.399 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,266 (Del. 2000)).
202 Id. at 697.
203 Id. at 697, 734-736.
204 ld. at 778.
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Disney pointed out that Delaware law does not require that
boards observe best practices and that courts will not find boards
liable for failing to adhere to best practices .205 Although the
compensation committee of the Disney board avoided liability
even though it met only twice with limited deliberation before
approving Ovitz's contract, best practices would have dictated that
a board should have met at length, each member should have
received detailed documentation, and that the board should have
heard detailed expert presentations on the structure of a large
severance package. 20 6
2. The Board Faced Complex Problems That Demanded
Great Governance
Unlike the negotiation of a CEO's compensation package,
as was the situation in Disney, the scope and depth of the issues the
Board faced with the Merrill deal were extremely complex, and
those complications were heightened due to the compressed time-
frame. After the quick investigation into Merrill's books BofA
decided to acquire Merrill in mid-September 2008.20  On
December 5, BofA's CFO told Lewis that losses at Merrill had
increased to $9 billion. That same day, the BofA shareholders
voted in favor of the Merger. On December 9, the CFO presented
the Board with detailed information about Merrill's losses. On
December 13, the CFO told Lewis that the losses at Merrill had
increased to $12 billion. On December 17, Lewis first contacted
Paulson to tell him that BofA had considered invoking the MAE.
On December 19, the Government asserted that BofA had no legal
ground on which to stand regarding the MAE and asked what
support BofA needed to close the deal with Merrill. On December
22, the Board held its first official meeting on the Merrill deal.
After that meeting, BofA management further negotiated with the
Government, and the next meeting of the Board occurred on
December 30.
BofA and the Board were shocked by the losses at Merrill
and how those losses increased so rapidly in the fourth quarter of
205 Id. at 697 ("Delaware law does not-indeed, the common law cannot--hold
fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices.").
206 Cf 907 A.2d at 762 ("The [CEO's] actions in connection with Ovitz' hiring should not
serve as a model for fellow executives and fiduciaries to follow.").
207 See Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 6, at Al. BofA never asked that the investment
banking firms it hired update their due diligence after September 15, 2008. Moore, supra note 10, at
C3. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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2008. Contractually, the MAE offered a potential out for BofA.
Invocation of the MAE would have resulted in a lawsuit, which
would later be settled. But, there was a glimmer of hope for BofA
that a court, via declaratory judgment, would have upheld the
MAE, allowing BofA to walk away without paying damages.
Coupled with having to decide whether or not to invoke the MAE,
the Board had to consider the Government's threat that if BofA
used the MAE, then the Government would oust management and
deny future requests for TARP funds. Thus, the Board could have
(1) decided to invoke the MAE and press forward in a recession
without the guarantee of Government aid; or (2) decided to
continue the deal with a commitment from the Government that
BofA would receive aid. By not absorbing Merrill, the
shareholders would not have lost voting power but would have
suffered the effects that prolonged litigation stemming from
invocation of the MAE would have on BofA's. But, BofA's share
price would likely have not dropped as severely as it did. In
acquiring Merrill, the shareholders faced dilution in two forms: (1)
Merrill shareholders that became BofA shareholders, and (2) the
possibility that shares issued to the Government would be shares of
common stock. Each choice presented intricate questions of law,
finance, and economics. In order to best evaluate these issues, the
Board needed to execute flawless corporate governance; that did
not happen.
3. The BofA Guidelines Demanded Better Process
From the Board
The Guidelines present a basic framework by which the
Board ought to have positioned itself to make an informed and
deliberate decision on the Merger. As Lead Director, Sloan's duty
was to ensure that significant information was transmitted from
executive management to the Board.2 °8 The Guidelines also
required that, before board meetings, BofA give the Board
pertinent information to make fully informed decisions. 20 9 When
board meetings were convened in December 2008, the Board ought
to have received supporting documents well in advance of those
meetings. Having received documents before a meeting, the Board
208 See BofA Corporate Governance Guidelines, supra note 86.
209 Id. See also Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14-A), Apr. 14, 2009, at 3
("[B]eginning in 2008, our directors began participating in weekly information meetings regarding
[BofA's] financial condition, lines of business, and developing market conditions" led by Lewis.).
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would have been able to pose meaningful and probing questions to
Lewis. The best source of documentation and information would
be internal and external financial experts. Yet, aside from Price's
December 9 presentation, nothing in the Board Minutes indicated
that expert presentations occurred at either the December 22 or
December 30 meetings. More importantly, the Guidelines provided
for access to outside legal counsel, which would have best enabled
the Board to evaluate the case for terminating the merger and also
enabled the Board to analyze the strength of the Government's
commitment to provide future funding to BofA.21 °
These basic provisions--(1) Sloan acting as a liason, (2)
pertinent documentation in advance of meetings, and (3)
availability of outside counsel and advisors-provided the Board
with ample opportunity to proceed according to best practices.
When BofA was in the process of evaluating the completion of a
major acquisition, while navigating a deteriorating economy and
seeking Government assistance, Sloan ought to have been in
frequent contact with Lewis and management. Nothing in the
December 22 or December 30 Board Minutes indicated that Sloan
accepted any more responsibility than other directors. The minutes
made no mention of any special questions raised by Sloan or
requests that Lewis have heightened contact with the Board. Sloan
failed the Board by not soliciting further information from Lewis
and management.
a. Counsel Should Have Had a Larger Role During the
December Meetings
The Board participated in the December special meetings
without outside counsel and did not even retain outside counsel to
assist with its own review of the Merger.211 Even without counsel
present at the meetings, if the Board was unsatisfied with
management's response to its questions, the Board ought to have
exercised its right to outside counsel after the meetings. The Board
ought to have sought outside advice immediately after the
"0 See BofA Corporate Governance Guidelines, supra note 86.
21' The December 22 and December 30 minutes do not indicate that the Board had
retained its own counsel to aid in its evaluation of proceeding with the Merger. The December 22
minutes only mention that Lewis "discussed in detail the content of the previous conversations with
federal regulators with the Board," not the Board and its counsel. Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra note
55 at 2. Press articles also do not suggest that the Board had retained its own counsel. In fact, BofA's
own counsel was not present at any Board meetings on the issue. See infra note 213 and
accompanying text.
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December 22 meeting because the Merger was set to close on
January 1. The Board could have presented the facts and its
concerns regarding the Merger to outside counsel shortly after that
meeting. 2 12 The Board would then know its options going forward
and the implications of closing the Merger as scheduled.
The Board participated in the December 22 and December
30 meetings not only without the presence of its own counsel but
without BofA's retained securities lawyers, Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz ("Wachtell"). 213  Consider one scenario in which
counsel's presence would have helped Lewis to know his and
BofA's rights: during a deposition, the New York Attorney
General's office asked Lewis if he knew what authority the
Government had to remove management and the Board. Lewis
responded that he just knew that the Government could have done
SO. Counsel could have fully evaluated the legal foundation on
which the Government based its argument. Lewis failed by not
seeking an opinion as to how the Government's threat would come
to pass.
b. Outside Counsel Could Have Objectively Evaluated
the Government's Commitment
By accepting the Government's oral promise to provide
funding in January, Lewis jeopardized the future of BofA. If the
Government had not followed through on its agreement to provide
BofA with further support after the Merger closed, then BofA
would have been severely weakened by having to independently
shoulder Merrill's losses. When the New York Attorney General's
office asked Lewis whether he obtained legal advice on the
stipulated agreement for additional funds from the Government in
January, Lewis responded that he relied on BofA's general
212 Whether selected before or after the meeting, to be truly effective this counsel would
not have been one of the firms already engaged by BofA but a newly-hired law firm.
213 Present at the December 22 meeting were only members of the Board and BofA
officers. Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra note 50. Present at the December 30 meeting, again, were
only members of the Board and even fewer BofA officers than were at the December 22 meeting.
Dec. 30 Board Minutes, supra note 58. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz was engaged in assisting
BofA Officers with preparation prior to the meeting. See E-mail from Nicholas G. Demmo, Partner
at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Brian T. Moynihan, BofA General Counsel, Bates Range
BAC-ML-HOGR-502-00000961 (Dec. 22, 2008, 7:21 PM GMT) (on file with author).
214 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 54:7-55:5 ("You had an understanding that the Fed
could remove the board and/or the management of a bank that it regulated if it found certain things.
[Lewis]: Yes.").
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counsel. 215 Lewis stated that he would not only rely on the general
counsel for such advice but Lewis would expect for the general
counsel to make the threshold point that he should seek advice on
the agreement. 216  This is shocking. Lewis entered into a vague
oral agreement of great magnitude and did not even realize on his
own that there were potential legal issues with the proposed
agreement and that he ought to seek legal counsel. Lewis
acknowledged the risk that the Government may back out, but he
was, nonetheless, "comfortable" with their assurances.217
In June 2009, Congressman Gerry Connolly questioned
Lewis as to whether or not BofA had received a reliable
commitment from the Government. 2 18 While the December 30
Minutes reveal that Lewis "obtained detailed oral assurances from
the federal regulators with regard to their commitment and ha[d]
documented those assurances with e-mails and detailed notes of
management's conversations with the federal regulators,, 219 based
on Lewis's June testimony, any such agreement was tentative at
best.220 Lewis did not even know the amount of funding to be
215 Id. at 84:23-85:19.
21"6 Id. at 85:10-14 ("[Lewis]: I would rely on somebody bringing that question forth, and
nobody did. Q. Did you ask anyone to look into whether the oral, verbal commitments from the Fed
and Treasury were enforceable? [Lewis]: No. I was going on the word of two very respected
individuals high up in the American government."). BofA general counsel, Brian Moynihan, was
present at the December 17 meeting with Bernanke and Paulson; the Dec. 22 and 30 Board Minutes
redacted portions of the meetings where Moynihan spoke.
217 E-mail from Brian T. Moynihan, BofA General Counsel, to Lewis, Bates Range BAC-
ML-HOGR-502-00000955-958 (Dec. 22, 2008, 3:40 AM GMT) (on file with author) ("We are
subject to the risk of the verbal commitments and statements are somehow not followed through
with by the Treasury and the Fed. I am comfortable after hearing the amount of reassurances, and
from whom they come that we can rely on them.").
218 See Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal
Bailout? Hearing Before the Comm on Oversight and Government Reform, 11 th Cong. (2009), webcast of
June 11, 2009 Lewis testimony at 2:37:59 - 2:42:29, available at: htp//oversight.house.govfmdex.php?
option=comcontent&task-view&id=3932&Itemid=2.219 Dec. 30 Board Minutes, supra note 58, at 3 (emphasis added).
22 0 Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?
Hearing Before the Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111 th Cong. (2009), webcast of June 11,
2009 Lewis testimony at 2:37:59 - 2:42"29, available at http'//oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=
comcontent&task-=view&id=3932&Itemid=2.
Lewis: We had an agreement that they would, that we would work toward a solution.
. there was back and forth in terms of amounts, in terms of structure, and in terms of
securities to be... included .... We had an agreement for a solution but we did not
have any kind of agreement, as I would.. . think of it as a business person.
Connolly: Well what about commitment? What was your understanding of the
commitment... ?
Lewis: Commitment to work toward a solution.
Connolly: ... You received, as part of that commitment, detailed oral assurances
from the federal regulators with regard to their commitment?
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provided by the Government or the form of securities BofA would
issue in exchange for capital, common stock or preferred stock.22'
Without details, how could Lewis and the Board have felt
comfortable that closing the Merger, when lacking a reliable safety
net from the Government, was the best course of action? Outside
counsel would have compelled the Board to either obtain
documentation of specific terms of an agreement or convinced the
Board that walking away remained the best option for BofA.
c. The Board Ought to Have Retained Counsel before
the December Meetings
By retaining outside counsel222 before the December 9
presentation by Price, outside counsel could have attended the
meetings and received information firsthand. Then, counsel could
have fully informed the Board of its own rights and duties going
forward, as well as the rights and duties of BofA, especially
whether or not BofA needed to disclose the Merrill losses to the
shareholders. The presence of outside counsel on December 9, as
well as on December 22 and December 30, would not only have
emboldened the Board's resolve, but the presence of counsel
would have imparted to Lewis, management, and the Government
the seriousness with which the Board viewed the merger and its
consummation or termination.
Lewis: Yes, sir...
Connolly: That sounds like more than a commitment to find a solution, that sounds
like it's pretty detailed and [you've] already worked out the solution... ?
Lewis: No . . . there was a back and forth . . . but there was never a, a specific
agreement uh, with specific numbers and uh, of that sort. It took several more weeks
before we could actually come to terms as to exactly what it would look like.
Connolly: Was there any intentional reason not to put the agreement in writing?
Lewis: No, sir, because there was, there was not enough specifics to put into writing.
Connolly: But at some point there were?
Lewis: Yes, sir, that was later, that was in the first few weeks of January of the
following year...
22' Id. Not only would the dollar amount and form of any capital funding be important, it
would have been necessary for BofA to know what covenants the Government would have attached
to any agreement. If those covenants were unfavorable, then, BofA, the Board, management, and
shareholders could have avoided being unnecessarily constricted by Government mandates.
222 In order to have fully reaped the benefits of outside counsel and advisors, the Board
should have examined itself in the light of inside and outside directors. Lewis held the joint position
of CEO and Chairman of the Board. As Lewis was a member of management, in addition to being a
Board member, he would have been biased with respect to any selection of outside counsel. Lewis,
as CEO, and the other inside director, Charles K. Gifford, should have been removed from any
potential session during which the Board discussed its selection of outside counsel.
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The Board would have had independent opinions, not
beholden to management, on which to rely.223  If present at the
meetings, then the Board's counsel would have been able to ask
questions during the course of the meetings. But, the ability to ask
precise questions depends upon the degree to which information
was presented to the Board before the meetings. If management
had not provided the Board with sufficient information before the
meeting, as the Guidelines mandated , then the energy expended by
the Board and its counsel during the meeting may have been spent
trying to catch up on facts224 before asking how, why, and what
regarding the cause of Merrill's losses. The Board and counsel
must have been fully engaged with the day-to-day events
surrounding Merrill's activities. This tied into Sloan's duty as
liaison between the Board and management-because Sloan failed
in his duty to pass information to the Board, the Board's ability to
understand and analyze Merrill was compromised.
That the Board's December 22 and December 30 meetings
were telephonic meetings also indicates a poor commitment to best
practices. While the meetings were held on short notice, that
such important meetings were conducted over the phone is
troubling. Telephonic discussions make it difficult for directors to
express their concerns, and directors may be more likely to
succumb to management pressure. 226 . Further, the December 22board meeting was not even one hour in length. 227 The brevity of
m BofA Officers were in frequent contact with outside counsel at Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz in preparation for the December 22 Board meeting. See E-mail from Nicholas G.
Demmo, Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Brian T. Moynihan, BofA General Counsel,
Bates Range BAC-ML-HOGR-502-00000961 (Dec. 22, 2008, 7:21 PM GMT) (on file with author).
In fact, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz advised BofA General Counsel, Brian Moynihan, that re-
characterizing the decision to close the deal as a decision rooted in a national interest would be wise
when speaking to the Board: "The point being that the decision to go forward is not motivated by a
desire of the Board and management to save their positions .... Id.
224 There is also the remote possibility that outside counsel would feel embarrassed to ask
simple questions for fear of appearing uninformed before its clients, and, as a result, outside counsel
would have kept quiet when the situation called for someone to raise concerns.
2' Even more troubling, internal BofA documents suggest that the December Board
meetings were voluntary. Cf E-mail from Brian T. Moynihan, BofA General Counsel, to Lewis,
Bates Range BAC-ML-HOGR-502-00000955-958 (Dec. 22, 2008, 3:40 AM GMT) (on file with
author) (. .. a call [Lewis] had with [ Paulson on Friday afternoon after our last voluntary board
meeting") (emphasis added).
226 Conference call participants may experience problems with background noise or
muting issues. Also, call participants are able to direct their attention to other matters, i.e., checking
e-mail or reading unrelated materials.
2 The December 22 board meeting convened at 4:00 PM Eastern Standard Time. Dec.
22 Board Minutes, supra note 50 ("Pursuant to due notice, a special meeting . . . was held by
telephone at 4:00 p.m. EST on Monday, December 22, 2008."). The meeting had concluded by 4:58
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this meeting indicates that the Board did not comprehend the
complex issues BofA faced; otherwise, the meeting would have
lasted much longer. Lacking information, independent counsel, and
face-to-face contact, the Board could not effectively question
Lewis. The Board ceded to the Government without meaningfully
debating the implications of closing the Merger on the
shareholders' wealth.
228
4. The Board Must Be More Transparent Regarding
Government Involvement
The Guidelines and the DGCL do not suggest that a board
may place the interests of the nation as a whole ahead of
shareholders' interests. The Guidelines were revised on December
9, 2008, when the Government's bailout of financial institutions
was in full swing and BofA was in the midst of evaluating Merrill.
If at that time BofA and the Board had adopted a policy by which
it was willing to submit to the wishes of the Government due to the
nation's poor economy, then the Board ought to have publicized
this policy, so as to give notice to the shareholders that their rights
were trumped by a duty to the nation's economy. In the absence of
an express policy, the Board ought not to have abrogated its duty
to effectuate the shareholder primacy norm229 in favor of a national
interest.
During his deposition with the New York State Attorney
General's staff, Lewis admitted that he acted adversely to the
interest of short term shareholders of BofA-those planning to sell
PM Eastern Standard Time, because at that time Lewis sent an e-mail to the Board confirming a
conversation Lewis had with Paulson after the board meeting concluded. See e-mail from Tom Ryan
to Ken Lewis (Dec. 22, 2008) , available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2009/apr/
pdfs/Exhibit/o20D%20to%204.23.09%201etter.pdf.
228 See Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 98:10-16:
Q. Did any of the board members say, Hey, we need to do something about this?
[Lewis]. Well, we were going to call the MAC.
Q. Right. Did they say, In lieu of calling the MAC is there anything we should do?
[Lewis]. No. It went from calling the MAC to strong admonition that we shouldn't.
Q. And, at that point, is there any discussion about disclosure to the shareholders?
[Lewis]. I don't recall it.
Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 98:10-16.
229 See, e.g., Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507 ("A business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end.").
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BofA stock in less than three years.23 0 Lewis also admitted that the
Board did not even discuss disclosing the decision not to invoke
the MAE to shareholders, much less submit the decision to a
231vote. In fact, some deals may call for a discreet point at which a
CEO and board should decide when to disclose adverse situations
to shareholders, such as exceeding a pre-set cap on prospective
losses due to a transaction. But, with BofA, there is no need to
point to a precise moment when a line was crossed. Lewis knew
that moving forward with the Merger would be adverse to BofA
shareholders over a course of years-that should have trigged
disclosure.
Lewis, with Paulson and Bemanke, concealed from
shareholders the state of the Merrill deal and the Government's
promise to provide future funds to BofA.232 Had the Board
followed best practices and retained counsel between the
December 9 presentation and the December 22 meeting, then the
Board would have been advised that it must decide whether or not
to disclose Merrill's losses to the shareholders. While the
shareholder vote had already occurred on December 5, the Merger
was not set to close until January 1. Disclosure during this interim
time period would have afforded the shareholders with some
recourse. They would have been able to voice their opinions and
dissent. Perhaps, some activist shareholders would have quickly
filed lawsuits seeking to prevent the Merger from closing. Lewis
230 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 96:15-25 ("[Q]: ... [W]hat they were telling you to
do was not in the one-to-three year interest of your shareholders. [Lewis]: I thought about in terms
of it was in the best interest of long term, and it was the only way to go under the circumstances.").
231 Lewis Dep. Tr., supra note 36, at 98:17-25. But see Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra note
50, at 3 ("The Board concurred it would reach a decision that it deemed in the best interest of the
Corporation and its shareholders without regard to this representation by the federal regulators.").
"Mr. Lewis noted that no vote was required by the Board, but that he wished to open the
recommendation for discussion among the Board and management." Dec. 22 Board Minutes, supra
note 50, at 3.
232 Dec. 30 Board Minutes, supra note 58, at 2 ("[A]ny written assurances would require
formal action by the Fed and Treasury, which formal action would require public disclosure."). In
fact, exhibits produced to Congress in November 2009 show that BofA's internal counsel and
outside lawyers were aware that disclosure of the Merrill losses was a problem. See Kucinich
Exhibits, Joint Hearing of the Oversight & Government Reform Comm. and Domestic Policy
Subcomm., Bank of America & Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?
Part IV, available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/DomesticPolicy/BofA.
Documents.pdf. Then BofA general counsel Timothy Mayopoulos expressed worries to outside
counsel, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, about not disclosing. Id. at Bates Range HOGR-WLRK-
502-00000919. Ultimately, on November 12, 2008, Mayopoulos and Price concluded that "no pre
meeting disclosures [were] necessary." Id. at Bates Range BAC-ML-HOGR-502-00001092.
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and the Board owed a duty first and foremost to BofA and its
shareholders, not the Government or the financial system.
V. THE AFTERMATH
The Merger has not been a success and the combined entity
has failed to deliver on the promises made by Lewis and Thain.
Despite posting a first quarter 2009 profit of $4.2 billion, critics
were skeptical of the sustainability of BofA's gains.233 Similar
remarks were made in response to BofA's second quarter results:
BofA relied on one-time sales to meet earnings expectations.
234
The synergies that were predicted have not come true.
235
Numerous Merrill bankers voluntarily left BofA.2 36  In July, BofA
announced that it would close 10% of its commercial banking
23 See Dan Fitzpatrick, For BofA, a $4.2 Billion Profit Isn t a Fix, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
2009, at C1, C3. See also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bank Profits Appear Out of Thin Air, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2009, at BI (noting that BofA booked revenue via a one-time sale of its holdings in China
Construction Bank and by increasing the valuation of Merrill assets by $2.2 billion compared to
Merrill's valuation of the same assets).
234 Dan Fitzpatrick & David Enrich, Citigroup, BofA Results Shine Light on Failings,
WALL ST. J., July 18, 2009, at BI, B2 (BofA's "net income would have been $1.4 billion absent six
one-time items. Some analysts said the bank would have posted a loss without the items."). In April
2009, BofA was forced to increase its cash reserves in order to defend against "future credit losses."
Fitzpatrick, supra note 233, at Cl, C3. "The bank's credit-card operations posted a loss of $1.7
billion, while mortgages and insurance suffered a loss of $498 million." Id.
235 See Dan Fitzpatrick & Susanne Craig, Moynihan's Power Play at BofA, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 8, 2009, at C I (noting that former BofA General Counsel, Brian Moynihan, who succeeded
Thain at Merrill, "clashed" with high-ranking Merrill executives, and "many unhappy bankers,
brokers and traders at Merrill... have big doubts about Mr. Moynihan. "); see also Dana Cimilluca,
Bank ofAmerica Seeks Overseas Repair Job, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009, at C3 (stating that Thomas
Montag, BofA's new "corporate and investment banking chief.. .faces what may prove to be one of
his biggest tests: steadying the turmoil-ridden overseas operations that BofA acquired in the Merrill
Lynch deal").
236 See Dennis Berman, Merrill Lynch Loses More Bankers to a 'Boutique, 'WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 15, 2009, at C3. ; see also Susanne Craig, Another Merrill Banker Quits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3,
2009, at C12 ("But in recent months, a number of bankers and top executives have fled [BofA] amid
a growing culture clash."); Matthew Karnitsching, Lazard Hires Telecom Head, WALL ST. J., June
15, 2009, at C3 (The banker that ran Merrill's global technology, media, and telecom group, "Mr.
[George] Young, 50 years old, left Bank of America Corp. in April .... ); Jeffrey McCracken,
Rikin to JP. Morgan, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2009, at C2 ("Longtime Merrill Lynch banker William
Riflkin has defected to rival J.P. Morgan Chase & Co .... ); Chad Bray, Ex-Merrill Executive
Settles Suit With BofA, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2009, at C4 ("[Robert] McCann sued [BofA] in New
York State Supreme Court in August, seeking to prevent the bank from stopping him from taking
another job right away."); cf Dan Fitzpatrick & Matthew Kamitsching, BofA Promotes Key
Executives, WALL ST. J., at CIO (BofA retained two veteran executives, who "are among several
high-ranking bankers to be retained in recent months as the Charlotte, N.C., lender tries to win over
key deal makers in the wake of multiple Merrill departures."); cf Dan Fitzpatrick & Dana Cimilluca,
Merrill Veteran Orcel Is Staying With BofA, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2009, at C3; see also Susanne
Craig, UBS's Merrill Injection, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2009, at C3.
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branches; Lewis said "that it would be 'much tougher' to make
money in the second half of 2009. ''237 BofA posted a $1.0 billion
net loss for the third quarter of 2009.238
On April 23, 2009, the New York State Attorney General,
Andrew Cuomo ("Cuomo"), wrote to members of Congress and
the SEC, concerning the Merger. 2 39  Cuomo "uncovered facts that
raise questions about the transparency of the TARP program, as
well as about corporate governance and disclosure practices at
,240[BofA]." Cuomo commented that the SEC "appear[ed] to have
been kept in the dark.",241  Cuomo's investigation into BofA has
progressed and may result in "securities-fraud charges against
[BofA] executives," stemming, in part, from BofA's failure to
"disclose before a December shareholder vote [] ballooning losses
at Merrill.,
24 2
On April 29, 2009, BofA shareholders stripped Lewis of
his title of Chairman of the Board; he retained the position of
CEO.243  Walter Massey, an acting board member with
longstanding ties to Lewis, was appointed to replace Lewis as
237 Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Plans to Cut 10% of Branches, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2009, at
C1 ("The retrenchment . . . comes as it continues its integrations of Merrill Lynch & Co. and
Countrywide Financial Corp., reshuffles leadership at the behest of regulators and fends off rising
credit losses.").
238 Press Release, Bank of Am. Corp., Bank of America Announces Third-Quarter Net
Loss of $1.0 Billion (Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=71595&p=irol-newsArticle&ID= 1342796&highlight; see also Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Posts A
Loss of $1 Billion, Discloses More on Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17,2009, at B3.
239 Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, State of New York, to Hon.
Christopher Dodd, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, et al
(Apr. 23, 2009) available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2009/apr/pdfs/
BofAmergLetter.pdf24 0 id.
241 Id.
242 See Dan Fitzpatrick, New York Nears Charges on Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
2009, at Cl. Cuomo warned BofA of potential charges via an early September letter, "citing at least
four 'failures' to tell shareholders material information related to the bank's takeover of [Merrill]."
id; see also Liz Rappaport, Dan Fitzpatrick, & Joann S. Lublin, Cuomo Calls In 5 BofA Directors,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at C3 ("Cuomo said he wonders broadly where the boards were in this
financial crisis, and whether BofA directors 'protected the rights of shareholders, were they misled,
or were they little more than rubber stamps for management's decision-making?"'). Ohio's Attorney
General has already filed suit against BofA for concealing Merrill's losses before the December
2008 shareholder vote. Marshall Eckblad, BofA Sued by Funds over Merrill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29,
2009, at C3. ; see also Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, In re Bank of Am. Sec.,
Derivative, & ERISA Litig., (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (No. 09-MDL-2058-DC).
243 Dan Fitzpatrick & Marshall Eckblad, Lewis Voted Out As BofA Chairman, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 30, 2009, at Al ("The vote marked the first time that a company in Standard & Poor's 500-
stock index has been forced by shareholders to strip a CEO of chairman duties, according to
RiskMetrics Group.").
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244Chairman. On September 30, Lewis announced that he would
resign as CEO and President of BofA, effective December 31,
2452009. Reports indicated that Lewis's resignation was not at the
request of the Government246 but that Lewis was "fed up with the
criticism that haunted him following the takeover of Merrill.,
247
While the Board has narrowed its search of potential successors to
Lewis, 248 the urgency of that search has been heightened due to the
chance Lewis will be sued.249
As of early May 2009, BofA entered into a confidential
agreement with the Government, committing to overhaul the
Board, replace members of management, and address capital
shortages. This agreement, known as a "Memorandum of
244 See Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann Lublin, Massey, A Physicist, Re-Engineers BofA, WALL
ST. J., June 8, 2009, at C1.
245 Bank of America, Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Item 5.02 (Oct. 1, 2009)
available at http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-sec2009&secCat0l
Enhanced.4 rs=-251&sec Cat0lEnhanced.4_rc=10.44 But see Dan Fitzpatrick & Michael Crittenden, BofA to Select Emergency CEO, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 5, 2009, at C3 ("Regulators will be asked to sign off on the choice .... Government
officials are expected to tell the bank if they don't approve of specific names .... "). The
Government holds "informal veto power" over who BofA chooses to replace Lewis. Fitzpatrick &
Crittenden, supra, at C3.
247 Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, Bank ofAmerica Chief Resigns Under Fire, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at Al; see also Dan Fitzpatrick, David Enrich, & Joann S. Lublin, BofA
Directors Scramble To Lay a Succession Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2009, at Cl. ; see generally
Carrick Mollenkamp & Dan Fitzpatrick, With Feds, BofA 's Lewis Met His Match, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 9, 2009, at Al.
248 See Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, BofA Narrows Internal CEO Candidates,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2009, at C1.
249 See Fitzpatrick & Crittenden, supra note 246, at C3. See also Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann
S. Lublin, Bank of America Bumps Into Hurdles in CEO Hunt, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2009, at C3
(stating that BofA has had difficulty finding qualified outside candidates who are interested in the
CEO position). The CEO of Bank of New York Mellon declined the BofA CEO position when
offered. Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, BNY Mellon CEO Kelly Tells BofA: No, Thanks, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 2, 2009, at C1. An executive at PNC Financial Services Group Inc., also rebuked a potential
offer of the CEO position from BofA due to the Government's control on executive pay through czar
Kenneth Feinberg. Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Hits Pay Snag In Its CEO Hunt, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14,
2009, at B1.
250 See Dan Fitzpatrick, US. Regulators to BofA: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., July 16,
2009, at Cl; see also Mollenkamp & Fitzpatrick, supra note 247, at Al ("Regulators, including
those from the Fed, said they planned to file a confidential memorandum of understanding against
the bank because of concerns about such things as governance and its ability to manage risk and
fund operations in times of stress. ."); see also Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann Lublin, BofA Gets New
Blood for Board, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2009, at B1; Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Is Planning to Add
Holliday as a Director, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2009, at C3. Also, in early May, the Government's
stress-test results mandated that BofA raise $33.9 billion of additional capital. Bank of America,
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.1 (May 9, 2009) available at
http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-sec2009&secCat0lEnhanced. 4 _
rs=641&secCat0lEnhanced.4_rc=10; see also Damian Paletta & Marshall Eckblad, How the Stress
Tests Stopped the Market Bleeding, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2009, at Cl (BofA's "gap of $33.9 billion
66 FSUBUSINESS REVIEW [Vol. 9
Understanding" and contemplated by regulators as early as
December 2008,251 led to the resignations of six members of the
Board, including Sloan,252 and the departures of top executives,
including BofA's Chief Risk Officer.253  On June 5, BofA
appointed four new members to the Board, each with banking
experience. On August 21, BofA announced that a former
president of Morgan Stanley had been appointed to the Board as
well.254 On July 31, three more members of the Board resigned.255
is the largest of the 19 stress-tested banks. It expects to fill that hole without any additional
government investment or ownership, meaning that the U.S. would not become a big shareholder via
conversion of an existing $45 billion TARP investment into common stock or mandatory convertible
preferred stock."). BofA avoided having to rely on Government funding to meet that figure, but it
issued a considerable number of shares to raise those funds, further diluting shareholders. See, e.g.,
Bank of America, Corp., Registration Statement (Form 424B5), at S-I (May 8, 2009) available at
http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-sec2009&secCatEnhanced.4_
rs=631&secCat01Enhanced.4_rc=10 (announcing registration of 1.25 billion shares of common
stock to raise approximately $10.987 billion). BofA made significant one-time sales of assets. See,
e.g., Rick Carew & Costas Paris, BofA Gets $7.3 Billion in CCB International Finance Sale, WALL
ST. J., May 13, 2009, at C2; see also Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Repayment to
TARP Hits Snag, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2009, at M12 (Future requirements to raise capital "create[]
a dilemma for the bank, which would rather not raise more capital, since that could dilute existing
shareholders and make their shares less valuable.").
251 In December 2008, federal regulators discussed aid that the Government would
possibly provide BofA in January 2009. Such aid would be provided concurrent "with a series of
actions including cutting drastically the dividend, some supervisory action (MOU) that covers
management .... [a regulator] always had [her] doubts about the quality of the due diligence [BofA]
did on the [Merrill] deal." E-mail from Deborah Bailey, Deputy Director of Banking Supervision
and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, to Mac Alfriend, Senior Vice President
of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, and Roger Cole,
Director of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Dec.
20, 2008, 01:32:00 EST) (Bates Stamp BOG-BAC-ML-COGROO0185, available at:
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090625093832.pdf; see also Solomon &
Fitzpatrick, supra note 250, at M12 (stating that disagreements between the Government and BofA
about BofA's ability to survive without federal funds have hampered BofA's hope to escape
Government scrutiny).
252 See Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) May 29, 2009, at Ex. 99.1(Sloan
resignation); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) June 4, 2009, Item 5.02 (Brinkley
resignation); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) June 8, 2009, Item 5.02 (Jackie Ward
and Patricia Mitchell resignations); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) June 19, 2009,
Item 5.02 (Admiral Joseph Prueher and General Tommy Franks resignations). Prior to May 2009,
four directors resigned. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 250, at C3 ("A total of 10 directors have stepped
down from [BofA's] board this year as regulators have demanded changes to governance, liquidity
and risk management. Mr. Holliday would be the sixth new director... since June.").
253 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) June 4, 2009, at Ex. 99.1.
254 Id.; see also Fitzpatrick & Lublin, supra note 250, at B1, B4 ("Four outside directors
with experience in banking or financial oversight joined [BofA's] board Friday, a move aimed at
satisfying strong suggestions from federal regulators that the Charlotte, N.C., lender improve its
corporate governance."); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Aug. 21, 2009, at Item
5.02, Ex.99.1 ("While co-president at Morgan Stanley, [Robert] Scully was responsible for asset
management, the Discover card business and merchant banking activities. Prior to that, he served as
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On August 3, 2009, the SEC filed a civil complaint against
BofA alleging that it misled investors about bonus payments to
former Merrill executives. 256  BofA and the SEC settled this
matter, wherein BofA, without admitting guilt, would pay $33
million to the SEC; however, Judge Jed Rakoff refused to approve
the settlement.257 Now, per court order, BofA must reveal even
more information about advice received from counsel during the
months leading up to the close of the Merger.258 This information
will shed even more light on how BofA, the Board, and counsel
259
evaluated moving forward with the Merger.
In August 2009, Congressman Dennis Kucinich asked that
the SEC focus on what BofA knew about Merrill's losses and what
ought to have been disclosed to shareholders. 260  Two BofA
directors, BofAW s former general counsel, and Moynihan recently
testified before Congress .2 6 Congress is awaiting the testimony of
the SEC and the FDIC representatives.2 62  But, Congress and
chairman of global capital markets and was vice chairman of investment banking where he was
responsible for talent development, senior client relationships and strategic initiatives.").
255 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), supra note 3, July 31, 2009, at Item
5.02 (John Collins, William Barnett, and Gary Countryman resignations).
256 Complaint at 1, Securities. & Exch. Comm'N v. Bank of Am., 653 F. Supp 2d 507
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2009) (No. 09-CIV-6829).
257 Order, Securities. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bank of Am., 653 F. Supp 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2009) (Case No. 09-CIV-6829); see also Memorandum Order, Securities. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Bank of Am., (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2009) (No. 09-CIV-6829).
258 Nathan Koppel, Ashby Jones & Amir Efrati, Law Firms Put in Unfamiliar Spot,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2009, at C3 ("The SEC stated in court filing that lawyers 'made the relevant
decisions concerning the disclosure of the bonuses.'"). In fact, Congress, which had already begun
investigating BofA, requested that SEC Chairperson Mary Schapiro testify as to the proposed SEC
settlement. See Kara Scannell, BofA Ruling Questions an SEC Weapon, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2009, at C1.
259 See David Enrich et al, BofA to Release Details of Merrill Advice, WALL ST. J., Oct.
13, 2009, at Cl (detailing waiver of attorney-client privilege in the New York State Attorney
General's investigation); Louise Story & Eric Dash, Deal Advice on Merrill To Be Aired, N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, at BI.
260 Letter from Dennis Kucinich, Chairman, Domestic Policy Subcommittee, to Mary
Schapiro, Chairwoman, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug.. 4, 2009) available at:
http://oversigbt.house.gov/index.php?option=com-content&task -'- view&id
= 4029&Itemid= 39.
261 See Michael Crittenden, BofA Said It Would Drop Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov.
17, 2009, at C3. On November 17, 2009, the House Committee on Oversight & Government
Reform, in its fourth public hearing, questioned Moynihan, former BofA general counsel Timothy
Mayopolos, and current directors Charles Gifford and Thomas May. See Bank of America and
Merrill Lynch: How Did A Private Deal Turn Into A Federal Bailout? Part IV,. Hearing Before H.
Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform and Subcomm. On Domestic Policy, 11 1' Congress
(2009), available at http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&task--view& id=
4678&Itemid=2.
262 Testimony slated for October 22, 2009 was postponed, pending fiuther investigations. Todd
Wollack, Mass. Banking Trio Face Queries, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct 21, 2009, available at .
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shareholders may never learn all that happened in late 2008. The
events since December are an ironic sequence. Government
agencies pressured BofA to close the Merger. By closing the
Merger, the Board's abdicated its duties to shareholders. In turn,
BofA became beholden to the Government, instead of its
shareholders. Now, the Government has demanded that BofA, the
Board, and management practice better corporate governance.
http://www.bostm.com/business/articles/2009/10/21/Mass-banking-trio-fa-ueriesmode=PF; see also
Press Release, Congressional Committee on Oversight & Government Reform, Towns, Kucmich to Hold
Fourth Bank of America - Merrill Lynch Hearing (Oct 20, 2009) availabLe at http'/ovcrsighthouse.gov/
indexphp?oplimrcom-cn tt&view-article&d=3765 
.-to ~ ch-wanttestirny_ 
_an d .
cox-on4-a-of-amenca-nmil-lynch-merger&catid=3press-releases&itermd=49 (scheduled witnesses
include curret SEC Chairperson Mary Schapiro, former SEC Chairperson Christopher Cox, FDIC
Chairpeson Sheila Bair, two BofA directors, and former BofA General Counsel Timothy Mayopolos).
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